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ABSTRACT 
Even before the current economic meltdown, waves of downsizing, starting in the late 1970s, 
had swept corporate America, eroding workers’ expectations of economic security.  But not only 
did downsizing become more prevalent during this period; its basic nature changed. Previously, 
firms had cut jobs temporarily, to adjust the size of their workforce during a downturn. Since the 
late 70s, firms have increasingly cut jobs in both good and bad times, in order to boost stock 
price. 
My dissertation examines the inter-group power dynamics underlying the transformation 
of workforce downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy. Examining both downsizing 
announcements from more than 700 leading U.S. corporations between 1981 and 2006, and 
actual implementation of the announced downsizing plans, I find at work in the process a shift in 
ideology, from an emphasis on corporate growth and conglomeration to an emphasis on 
profitability and shareholder value, an ideology that both reflects and intensifies the growing 
influence of shareholders over firms and the declining role of labor.  
My first empirical chapter examines the role of institutional investors and shareholder-
value-oriented managers in the transformation. The second empirical chapter examines the 
potential resistance from labor unions and shows how the anti-union stance of the public policy 
regime in the 1980s weakened unions’ power to resist. The last empirical chapter examines the 
role of investors, unions, and executives in the implementation of announced downsizing plans 
and demonstrates the contested nature of the implementation process.  iv 
 
Together, these three chapters illustrate the class politics simmering under the surface of 
the acceptance of downsizing for shareholder-value maximization, and emphasize the role of 
agency and power, as constructed by particular institutional logics, not only in promoting but 
also resisting the process of institutional change. 
   v 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In February, 1993, IBM, the world’s largest computer maker, announced that it would order the 
first layoffs in its 80-year history. This announcement came after months of hinting. When IBM 
said in December of the previous year that it would cut 25,000 jobs, it warned that some of these 
cuts might be made through layoffs. Although the company was a pioneer in personal computers, 
it had suffered from a steady decline in profitability and slow growth in past years. Its decline 
was due in large part to a strategic mistake it made at the beginning of the 1980s; it over-hired 
and over-built in expectation that business would be better. Instead, the company was faced with 
a prolonged industry-wide slackening of demand for computers and tougher international as well 
as domestic competition. Therefore, the company needed to adjust its total work force and reduce 
costs, to return to profitability and maintain its competitive edge.      
Nevertheless, IBM’s decision to make layoffs marked a drastic departure from its 
acclaimed tradition of full employment. Throughout its history, the company had prided itself on 
caring for its employees. Even when the company needed to adjust its work force in a period of 
weak demand, it relied on normal attrition, limited hiring, and early retirement incentives, rather 
than massive layoffs. During the downturn in the computer industry in 1986, it offered its senior 
employees special incentives for retiring early, and more than 10,000 of its U.S employees 
accepted them (Coy 1986). In the same year, when the company closed a parts distribution center 
in Greencastle, Indiana (the biggest closing of a facility in its history), it offered jobs elsewhere 
within the company to all of the 985 displaced workers, in keeping with its full-employment 
tradition (Huddleston 1986). Even during the severe recession of 1991, the company attempted 2 
 
to reduce its total work force by 14,000, again with substantial incentives for early retirement 
and voluntary departure (Clary 1991).  
IBM’s decision to make layoffs, thus, indicated a significant shift in the way America’s 
biggest companies—once considered providers of secure jobs and stable careers—treated their 
employees. Seen in a broader context, however, what was truly remarkable was that the company 
had managed to do without layoffs for so long, while its peers had already jumped ship. In fact, 
waves of downsizing had swept through corporate America throughout the 1980s, eroding the 
sense of economic security for middle and working class Americans, what Paul Osterman (1999, 
p. 21) terms the “postwar institutional structure” of the labor market. This change has reflected a 
fundamentally new conceptualization of employment relations on the part of employers.  
Of course, downsizing per se is nothing new. Even before the early 1980s, firms laid off 
their employees during economic downturns. What alarmed many observers of the trend in 
corporate downsizing, around the time of IBM’s layoff decision, was that, unlike in the past, 
even healthy companies were laying off employees. Scholars of industrial relations noticed a 
general change from downsizing primarily in times of economic downturn to downsizing in both 
good and bad times (Cappelli 1999; Osterman 1999). For instance, Eastman Kodak Company 
announced its plan to trim 10,000 jobs in the next two years. While the company had been 
consistently profitable, its institutional investors exerted heavy pressure for the company to 
increase its profit margins. Later in the same year, Xerox Corporation followed suit with a plan 
to cut more than 10,000 jobs or nearly 10 percent of its work force. Like Kodak, Xerox had been 
consistently profitable before the announcement, but it sought even higher profits through drastic 
cost-cutting measures. Its CEO explained: “To compete effectively, we must have a lean and 3 
 
flexible organization which can deliver the most cost-effective document-processing products 
and services” (Holusha 1993).  
Also conspicuous recently when firms make their decision on downsizing is their 
intention to maintain, restore, and boost their financial performance—or more precisely their 
stock price. When Jonathan Schwartz, the new CEO of Sun Microsystems, announced on May 
31, 2006 that the company planned to cut 4,000 to 5,000 jobs in the next six months, he stated 
that the expected cost savings from the job cuts would help Sun meet analyst forecasts of a loss 
of 2 cents a share in the fourth quarter. Meeting analyst forecasts matters here, because stock 
price tends to decline when firms do not meet analyst forecasts, and this adversely affects both 
shareholders and executives holding stock options. This explains why the new CEO was so eager 
to ensure that the firm would meet analyst forecasts. As a matter of fact, analysts viewed the job 
cuts as the bare minimum and suggested that the cuts, which were largely expected, were already 
built into analyst forecasts (Flynn 2006). 
This radical shift in the nature of downsizing disproves the simple economic 
interpretation that downsizing since the early 1980s represents a natural adjustment that can 
remove corporate inefficiencies amassed during the previous decades of economic prosperity 
(Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff 2003; Caves and Krepps 1993). Even in the early 1980s, large-scale 
workforce downsizing was dubbed as a last-ditch effort to save a gasping venture, but it has now 
become an “accepted way of managing, the norm rather than unusual, and the way of life 
(Budros 1997, p. 244). Companies argue that layoffs, in good times as well as bad, have become 
essential in an age of cutthroat competition (Murray 1995), but many critics have raised concerns 
about the harmful impacts downsizing has had on individual workers, their families and 
communities (Uchitelle 2006). How, then, has such a controversial practice as workforce 4 
 
downsizing come to be considered as business-as-usual? How does the sense of downsizing as an 
acceptable organizational practice emerge in the first place? 
In this dissertation, I examine this transformation of workforce downsizing as a 
shareholder-value-management strategy since the 1980s, by tracing the histories of downsizing 
and analyzing its consequences for more than 700 large U.S. corporations during the period 
between 1981 and 2006. Building on previous sociological studies of downsizing, I find at work 
in the transformation a shift in ideology, from an emphasis on corporate growth to an emphasis 
on profitability and shareholder value, an ideology that both reflects and intensifies the influence 
the financial sector generally on firm behavior. Leading the change have been institutional 
investors in the stock market, who have come to control large blocks of stock of most U.S. firms 
since the 1980s, and corporate managers, who have become more receptive to the norm of 
shareholder primacy. Other stakeholders, workers and their unions in particular, have protested 
the growing influence of financial sector and the increasing tendency among major U.S. firms to 
downsize to boost profits, but my analyses show that their ability to resist these changes have 
been severely undermined by the political environment hostile towards labor unions. 
Nevertheless, my analyses also show that the contest among investors, managers, and workers 
over downsizing persist in the actual implementation of downsizing plans. In all, these findings 
illustrate the contested nature of institutional change, highlighting the role of agency and power 
in the process.  
 
1.1  PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON DOWNSIZING 
By all accounts, it is clear that corporate downsizing has become prevalent among large U.S. 
corporations since the early 1980s. What explains this increase in downsizing and, more 5 
 
important, its new use? Most existing economic studies on downsizing focus on its impact on 
corporate performance, but much fewer studies examine the causes of downsizing. Nevertheless, 
the findings of the economic studies pose an intriguing question, which is relevant to the present 
research. Most economic studies find that downsizing has a negative, rather than positive, effect 
on corporate performance measured as both operating and stock-market performance. What then 
explains the growing popularity of downsizing as a value-maximizing strategy?  In this respect, I 
argue, existing economic studies on the causes downsizing fails to provide a convincing 
explanation. Sociological studies on the same issue provide a more promising explanation, but, 
as I will soon explain, that explanation has several limitations that need to be addressed.  
 
1.1.1  Economic Research on Downsizing 
There are a considerable number of studies on downsizing by economists, and some of them 
provide insight into the growing prevalence of downsizing since the 1980s. They predict that 
firms more engage in downsizing in order to restore or enhance their performance, but their 
empirical findings often defy this efficiency-based explanation of downsizing.  
Causes of Downsizing. There are several economic explanations for the recent surge in 
downsizing activity among U.S. firms. First, firms downsize in response to declining operating 
performance (Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff 2003; Bluestone and Harrison 1982). According to 
these accounts, U.S. firms have continued to downsize even during good times, because of fierce 
foreign competition. Baumol, Blinder and Wolff (2003), using industry-level data, demonstrate 
that downsizing has been most prevalent in traditional manufacturing sectors where American 
companies have faced the severest competition from their foreign competitors. Another 
explanation for downsizing during profitable periods is that U.S. companies had become ‘fat’ 6 
 
through the 1960s and 1970s (Gordon 1996; Love and Nohria 2005). According to this 
explanation, during the takeover wave in the 1960s, U.S. firms expanded by acquiring or 
merging with other firms in industries unrelated to their core businesses (Bhagat, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1990). The resulting conglomerate firms often had bloated managerial ranks (Caves and 
Krepps 1993). This conglomerate strategy prevailed among major U.S. firms throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, but most conglomerate firms were plagued by poor performance and 
undervalued stock price (Berger and Ofek 1995; Comment and Jarrell 1995; Lang and Stulz 
1994). In this context, downsizing can be understood ad an attempt by firms to reduce 
redundancies and to regain efficiency. Finally, new technologies may explain why even 
profitable firms engage in downsizing. With advanced technologies, firms can maintain 
productivity with fewer employees. What has been critical in this respect is the introduction of 
information technology. But there remains considerable controversy about whether technological 
innovations are the main reason for the increased rate of downsizing among U.S. firms. Hence, It 
is often argued that the impact of technological changes depends on how technological 
innovations are use (Fernandez 2001).  
Consequences of Downsizing. If downsizing became prevalent because it enhances a 
firm’s competitiveness and efficiency, as most economic studies assert, or because of 
technological innovation, performance should improve after downsizing. The evidence, however, 
is mixed at best (Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, and Pandey 2010). A number of studies examine firm 
profitability (mostly operating performance) subsequent to downsizing. While a few of these 
report improvement in profitability (Kang and Shivdasani 1997; Perry and Shivdasani 2005; 
Wayhan and Werner 2000), most studies find no evidence that downsizing improves long-term 
performance, or that it hurts firm profitability and reputations (Cascio, Young, and Morris 1997; 7 
 
De Meuse, Vanderheiden, and Bergmann 1994; Dougherty and Bowman 1995; Flanagan and 
O’Shaughnessy 2005; Guthrie and Datta 2008; Love and Kraatz 2009).  
Studies of market reactions to downsizing announcements come to a similar conclusion. 
They find that such announcements tend to incur significantly negative reactions in the stock 
market (Hallock 1998; Lee 1997; Nixon, Hitt, Lee, and Jeong 2004; Worrell, Davidson, and 
Sharma 1991). In probably the first systematic investigation of the issue, Worrell et al. (1991, p. 
674) suggest that layoff announcements generally convey negative information to investors, 
consistent with the notion that such announcements are viewed as a signal that a firm’s financial 
troubles are real. Also interesting is Lee’s (1997) study showing that the market seem to react 
more negative to downsizing in the United States even than in Japan, where downsizing is not 
widely accepted. These negative reactions are puzzling, given the claim of sociological studies 
that U.S. companies engage in downsize under the pressure from the financial market. The 
negative reactions from that very market require explanation.  
To make sense of these unexpected negative findings, a few studies argue that the effect 
of downsizing is contingent on pre-downsizing conditions. Industry also seems to matter. First, 
Love and Nohria (2005) distinguishes between proactive and reactive downsizing. Reactive 
downsizing occurs when firms are compelled to downsize because their performance is already 
in decline, while proactive downsizing when firms downsize preemptively in the anticipation of 
difficult times in the future or in a bid to enhance their competitive standing. Love and Nohria 
show that only proactive downsizing leads to positive post-downsizing outcomes. Another study 
suggests that the impact of downsizing is contingent on industry characteristics;  specificially, 
downsizing is more detrimental for firms in industries characteriszed by high R&D intensity, 
high growth, low capital intensity, and high dynamism (Guthrie and Datta 2008). Finally, 8 
 
Palmon, Sun, and Tang (1997) suggest that the stock market reacts differently to downsizing 
announcements depending on the reasons provided for the decision to downsize. Specifically, 
downsizing announcements citing the firm’s intention to improve profitability or efficiency tend 
to incurs positive reactions, whereas those citing poor market conditions negative reactions. 
Interesting, however, in both cases, downsizing does not improve the firms’ long-term 
profitability. Downsizing has a significantly negative effect on the long-term profitability of the 
former group, and so does it, to a lesser degree, for the latter group.  
Critique of Economic Research on Downsizing. Although existing economic studies 
shed light on the prevalence of downsizing, they are limited in several crucial ways. First, the 
thesis that downsizing has become prevalent as firms attempt to restore declining performance 
may explain downsizings in the early 1980s, when the U.S. economy was hard hit by a severe 
recession. It may not, however, adequately explain downsizings under improved economic 
situations in the 1990s. Second, if the prevalence of downsizing reflects potential efficiency 
gains or equivalently potential cost savings through elimination of redundancies or application of 
new technology, downsizing should lead to a significant improve in corporate performance, 
which, as reviewed above, often does not occur. The contingency argument provides a more 
nuanced account of why downsizing does not always improve performance. But it still does not 
explain why many firms that are unlikely to benefit from downsizing continue to engage in 
downsizing. Furthermore, the contingency argument raises a more fundamental issue. It suggests 
that only proactive downsizing leads to a significant improvement in corporate performance. But 
the very notion of proactive downsizing, that profitable firms should also downsize in order to 
further enhance their profitability, is a novel conception that was unheard of before the 1980s. 
Back then, firms downsized reactively as a temporary measure during economic downturns. Why 9 
 
and how has it become legitimate for firms with even healthy profits to cut jobs in a massive 
scale? There should be more than mere economic calculations involved in the transformation.  
 
1.1.2  Sociological Research on Downsizing: A New Paradigm of the Firm 
Most economic studies do not adequately explain the changed nature of downsizing, mainly 
because of the asociological assumption that the orientation of firms remains constant. 
Organizational institutionalists challenge such a notion and argue that  “institutional frameworks 
define the ends and shape the means by which interests are determined and pursued” (Scott 1987, 
p. 508). Building on this crucial insight, an alternative sociological perspective of the firm 
maintains that, to understand corporate behavior, one has to start off examining firms’ 
institutional contexts at a specific historical moment, suggesting that what is counted as 
imperative when a firm makes key strategic decisions varies in different contexts (Davis, 
Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994; 1997; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Fligstein 1990; 1996; Mizruchi, 
Stearns, and Marquis 2006).  
Similarly, the changed nature of recent downsizings should be understood within the 
changed institutional environment of the firm since the 1980s. As the prosperity of the postwar 
years came to an end in the 1970s, culminating in stagflation and bear markets, many large U.S. 
companies experienced a chronic decline in their market share and profitability. This stimulated 
emerging power groups in financial markets to search for a remedy. Leading the charge were 
institutional investors, such as large public pension and mutual funds. In a social-movement-like 
fashion, they began to challenge management of leading U.S. firms and promoted the new 
financial orthodoxy that the only legitimate goal of corporations is to maximize returns to their 
shareholders—the shareholder-value paradigm of the firm. As a result, firms have come under 10 
 
increased pressure from financial markets to boost profits and thus stock price. The prevalence of 
downsizing is indicative of this paradigm shift within the corporate sector since the 1980s. In fact, 
many prominent scholars of industrial relations as well as sociologists attribute the change to the 
norm of shareholder primacy (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Budros 1997; 2000; 2002; Cappelli 
1999; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Hirsch and De Soucey 2006; Kochan forthcoming; Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan 2000; Osterman 1999).  
There are several sociological studies that empirically test the claim that financial market 
pressure might have driven the emergence of the new downsizing, but their evidence seems less 
than conclusive. In a series of studies using data on Fortune 100 firms from 1979 to 1994, 
Budros (1997; 2000; 2002) demonstrated that decline in shareholder value (measured as 
percentage change in a firm’s stock price) triggered corporate downsizing. Using industry-level 
data, Fligstein and Shin (2007) also showed that industries with low profits relative to assets 
were more likely to engage in layoffs. Like most economic studies, they demonstrate that 
declining performance leads to downsizing but then argue that pressure from the financial 
community may explain such a relationship. It is also likely, however, that poor performance 
may induce firms to voluntarily downsize. In addition, similar patterns have also been observed 
in contexts where shareholder-value orientations have not been central, such as Japan in the 
1980s (Kang and Shivdasani 1997). Although it does seem likely that the shareholder-value 
paradigm has brought about the new form of downsizing, it still remains unclear by what 
processes this has occurred. 
 
1.2  SOCIO-POLITICAL ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSOFRMATION OF 
DOWNSIZING 11 
 
Despite their contributions to our understanding of the changed nature of downsizing, however, 
previous sociological studies have significant limitations. There are two broad issues. The first 
one is that of agency: who in the financial markets have pushed firms to downsize? The usual 
suspects are institutional investors, who have become dominant players in financial markets in 
the U.S. as well as abroad (Davis and Thompson 1994; Dobbin and Zorn 2005; Useem 1996). 
But pressure from institutional investors alone may not explain the growing tendency among 
leading U.S. firms to downsize; in any case, it is executives who should make the final decision. 
Hence, it is important to sort out agents of financial capitalism within the firm and to see how 
they respond to external pressure. Another important issue is how other stakeholders, workers 
and labor unions in particular, have responded to the change. When firms engage in downsizing, 
workers are the ones who suffer the most. Furthermore, the fact that even profitable firms now 
downsize to further enhance profits should generate bitter feelings among workers. Nevertheless, 
few studies have examined whether and how resistance from workers and their unions prevent 
firms from engaging in downsizing. During the postwar years, labor unions had some control 
over how firms adjust their workforce in response to economic hardship. The prevalence of 
downsizing since the 1980s suggests that unions have lost their control over the process, but why 
and how?  
My dissertation addresses these issues and provides a socio-political account of the 
transformation of downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy, involving both the role of 
institutional investors and shareholder-value oriented managers in promoting downsizing and the 
resistance from labor unions. My socio-political account draws on two recent approaches in the 
institutional literature—the institutional approach to power and institutional pluralism. The first 
approach emphasizes the role of power and interest group politics in the process of 12 
 
institutionalization. Early work of organizational institutionalists has been criticized because of 
its lack of attention to the role of power and agency (DiMaggio 1988; Mizruchi and Fein 1999; 
Perrow 1986; Powell 1991). In response, later work attempts to incorporate the role of power and 
agency, particularly to explain institutional change. Hence, it is argued that shifts in a firm’s 
institutional environment, such as the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm, do not 
automatically affect its strategy; instead, the ultimate outcome is crucially dependent on the 
power struggle among the firm’s external as well as internal constituents (Davis, Diekmann, and 
Tinsley 1994; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Fligstein 1990; Roy 1997). It is important here to 
reiterate that power relations among these constituents themselves are affected by shifts in 
institutional arrangements; in short, power and interest are also institutionally constructed 
(Dobbin and Jung 2012).  
Another important recent approach in the institutional literature is institutional pluralism. 
While early institutional work assumes the presence of one dominant institutional logic, later 
work challenges the resulting imagery of a homogeneous institutional field governed by one 
dominant logic within a given place or time (Fligstein 1990; Haveman and Rao 1997; Ocasio and 
Kim 1999; Ruef and Scott 1998; Thornton and Ocasio 1999). Instead, later work sees 
institutional fields as composed of multiple institutional logics. The original insight comes from 
Friedland and Alford’s widely-cited work in 1991. They suggest that there are multiples 
institutions in the western capitalist world, including capital market, bureaucratic state, 
democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion. As these multiple institutions often shape 
individual preferences and organizational interests in contradictory ways, they tend to generate 
tensions among individuals or organizations with competing preferences and interests, which 
become the primary driver of institutional (Clemens and Cook 1999; Seo and Creed 2002; 13 
 
Stryker 2000). Subsequent studies have demonstrated how the presence of multiple institutional 
logics politicizes the process of institutional diffusion (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Fiss and 
Zajac 2004; Greenwood et al. 2010; Hoffman 1999; Ingram and Rao 2004; Marquis and 
Lounsbury 2007).  
Although these two developments—the attention to the role of power and interest group 
politics and the emphasis on institutional pluralism—have emerged rather separately by different 
groups of institutionalists, they share lots of common assumptions and are intimately related with 
each other. On the one hand, the content and intensity of interest group politics should be 
crucially determined by the availability of multiple institutional logics. According to the 
institutional approach to power, the influence of different interest groups is not given but shaped 
by higher social orders (Jepperson 1991; Scott 1987). Hence, without logics that sharply define 
group interest, interest group politics is unlikely to intensify to the point that triggers significant 
institutional change. On the other hand, by the same token, the presence of multiple logics does 
not mean much unless there are carriers of different logics. Histories are full of examples where 
out-of-dated causes or ideas became revitalized as new social groups mobilized them to advance 
their economic and political interests (Blyth 2002; Campbell 2004).  
In this dissertation, I attempt to synthesize these two approaches in order to construct a 
socio-political account of the transformation of downsizing. I attend to the role played by three 
interest groups in the process—corporate managers, institutional investors, and labor unions, 
who promote competing institutional logics about the firm-employee relationship. Institutional 
investors, the primary promoter of the shareholder-value paradigm, have pushed firms to 
downsize if that helps boost corporate performance. In contrast, labor unions, the primary 
defender of industrial unionism and the business-labor social contract, have tried to prevent 14 
 
downsizing for profit maximization. Finally, managers initially resisted the logic of shareholder 
primacy but have thus become increasingly receptive to the logic. In three separate but closely 
related chapters, I explore how this inter-class power struggle over definition of the legitimate 
form of downsizing unfolds. In the first chapter, I examine the role of institutional investors in 
pushing for downsizing to maximize shareholder value, and why managers have become more 
receptive to such demand from investors. In the second chapter, I examine how labor unions 
have resisted the spread of downsizing and how the anti-union stance of the U.S. government in 
the 1980s undermined unions’ power to resist the change. These two chapters together tell the 
story of how the rise of shareholder primacy has shifted the balance of power between investors 
and workers and thereby has led to a radical reconceptualization of the firm-employee 
relationship. But the last chapter, however, demonstrates the lingering political tension over the 
transformation of downsizing among investors, managers, and workers. It examines the 
implementation of announced downsizing plans and demonstrates the contrasting influences of 
the three groups over the pace and intensity of downsizing.  
 
1.3  RESEARCH DESIGN  
To demonstrate the validity of my socio-political account, I examine the roles of institutional 
investors, corporate managers, and labor unions in (1) downsizing announcements, and (2) the 
actual implementation of announced downsizing plans. The research design for my dissertation 
has a number of important advantages over previous studies of downsizing. First, while many 
previous studies of corporate downsizing were done at the industry level, my dissertation project 
focuses on firm-level dynamics. This has been done by tracing the complete histories of 15 
 
downsizing announcements for more than 700 large U.S. corporations between 1981 and 2006; 
altogether, more than 6,000 announcements have been identified thorough archival search.  
Second, I analyze both downsizing announcements and the actual implementation of the 
announced downsizing plans. This research design has two merits. Methodologically, it 
addresses the thorny measurement issue of whether the proper measure of downsizing is the 
intention to downsize or the actual reduction in the number of employees. Announcements of 
downsizing may not lead to an actual workforce reduction, but an actual headcount reduction 
may result from other events, such as divestiture. The present research avoids this problem by 
examining both in two separate analyses. Furthermore, any possible discrepancy between 
downsizing announcements and actual implementation is more than measurement error; it itself 
merits some theoretical explanation. Institutional theory suggests that such a decoupling is 
prevalent when organizational action is driven by external pressures (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Hence, I expect that if firms engage in downsizing activities in response to pressures from the 
financial community, decoupling of actual implementation from announcements of downsizing 
will be prevalent.  
Third, for the actual implementation of announced downsizing plans, I have collected 
detailed information about workforce size and composition at the establishment level rather than 
at the firm level. Information is obtained from the annual “EEO-1” reports that private sector 
establishments submit to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). These 
reports identify the location and industry in which each establishment operates and break down 
annual employment by nine job categories—(1) managers and officers, (2) professionals, (3) 
technicians, (4) sales workers, (5) administrative support workers, (6) craft workers, (7) 
operatives, (8) laborers and helpers, and (9) service workers. This feature of my research design 16 
 
will enable me to examine another important issue: whether the impact of downsizing varies 
across different occupational groups—especially for white-collar jobs and blue collar jobs. I 
have matched the data from EEO-1 reports with firm-level data from other sources. The use of 
these varied sources enables me to construct a comprehensive data set containing information on 
both financial and workforce status of the largest U.S. companies over a period of more than 
twenty years. 
 
1.4  DATA 
The initial sample included 789 large U.S. companies that were traded between 1965 and 2006. 
The sampling frame is Fortune’s list of America’s largest firms, supplemented by information 
from Dun’s Million Dollar Directory for selected industries.  We stratified the sample by 
industry, selecting a roughly equal number of firms from 23 industries.
1 The majority of 
industries (16 out of 23) were sampled exclusively from the Fortune Industrial 500. Some sectors, 
however, such as communications, utilities, transportation, wholesale and retail, service, health 
care, and entertainment, are not included in this list. For entertainment and health care, we used 
Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory for years before 1983, at which point Fortune 
began to cover these industries.  
Whereas most longitudinal datasets are sampled in a single year (typically at the 
midpoint), my collaborators in data collection and I sampled firms evenly across the entire 
period so as to achieve a more representative group of firms, and so as to include both firms and 
industries on the rise as well as those in decline. We sampled systematically, within industries, 
                                                 
1 These are aerospace, apparel & leather, automobile and transportation equipment, building materials, chemicals, 
communications, computer, electrical equipment, entertainment, food, healthcare, machinery, metal & metal 
products, mining, oil extraction & construction, paper & wood products, petroleum refining, pharmaceutical, 
publishing, retail & wholesale, service, textile, transportation, and utilities.  17 
 
with replacement when a firm already appeared in the sample. For every other sampling year 
starting in 1965 and ending in 2005, we drew two names from half of the industries, and one 
name from the other half. I enlarged the sample size by repeating the procedure for every other 
sampling year between 1966 and 2006 to draw one name from half of the industries. In a few 
cases (e.g., computers in the mid-1960s) we could not fill a cell and so left it empty. After 
eliminating foreign subsidiaries and firms whose data were not available in Compustat (the 
principal source for basic financial information), the final sample contained 789 firms. For this 
dissertation, I use data on 714 firms that existed between 1981 and 2006.  
 
1.5  STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The following three empirical chapters explore the role of agency and power in institutional 
change, by examining the role of competing interest groups in the transformation of downsizing 
as a shareholder-value strategy. The first chapter examines the role of institutional investors and 
shareholder-value-oriented managers in the transformation. The second chapter examines the 
potential resistance from labor unions and shows how the anti-union stance of the public policy 
regime in the 1980s weakened unions’ power to resist. Finally, the last chapter addresses the 
issue of implementation. In the first and second chapters, I examine downsizing announcements, 
but it should be equally important whether and how they are actually implemented. The last 
chapter demonstrates the contested nature of the implementation process, by showing the 
contrasting roles of investors, managers, and unions.  
   18 
 
2  THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORKFORCE DOWNSIZING AS A 
SHAREHOLDER-VALUE STRATEGY 
 
Since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, pension assets for 
both private and public sector employees have flooded into the equity market, turning 
institutional investors in charge of those assets into controlling shareholders of large U.S. 
companies (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, p. 47; Useem 1996). In pursuit of greater returns, 
institutional investors have begun to challenge corporate management and have brought about a 
new paradigm for how firms should be run, based on the notion that the sole goal of publicly-
traded companies is to maximize returns to shareholders (Fligstein and Markowitz 1993). 
Organizational institutionalists have long emphasized the importance of dominant management 
paradigms, or what Neil Fligstein, a prominent institutionalist, terms conceptions of control, 
which not only define what constitutes the right relations among key stakeholders but also 
determine whose interests should be given priority (Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Fligstein 1990; 
2001).
2 The rise of the shareholder-value paradigm in the 1980s in particular has had profound 
implications for class dynamics in the American workplace—for example, an unequal 
distribution of power and wealth between owners and workers in favor of the former (Fligstein 
and Shin 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011).  
One indication of the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm is the increasing prevalence 
of workforce downsizing (Kalleberg 2009). Workforce downsizing has not only become more 
prevalent (Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff 2003), but its nature has changed. Previously, firms laid 
employees off temporarily to adjust workforce size during downturns (Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie 1994). Since the early 1980s, however, firms have increasingly cut jobs permanently 
                                                 
2 Hereafter, I use management paradigms and conceptions of control interchangeably.  19 
 
in both good and bad times, as a strategy to maximize profits (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; 
Cappelli 1999; Osterman 1999). Previous studies by organizational sociologists have linked this 
new form of downsizing to the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm (Budros 1997; 2002; 
Fligstein and Shin 2007; Hirsch and De Soucey 2006; Useem 1993), but evidence of this link has 
not yet been conclusive. A study by Budros (1997), arguably the best empirical work on this 
issue thus far, shows that a decline in a firm’s stock price triggers downsizing, suggesting that 
pressure from shareholders for greater returns induce firms to downsize. Similar patterns, 
however, have also been observed in contexts where shareholder-value orientations are not 
widely accepted, such as Japan in the 1980s (Kang and Shivdasani 1997). Although it does seem 
likely that the shareholder-value paradigm has brought about the new form of downsizing, it still 
remains unclear by what processes this has occurred.  
In this paper, I aim to develop a fuller account of how the shareholder-value paradigm 
has promoted the new form of workforce downsizing. This account has two components. First, 
building on resource dependence theory, I suggest a mechanism of coercion operating through 
the power of external resource providers to impose their preferred management paradigms upon 
firms (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Prechel and Morris 2010). Since the 1980s, large U.S. 
companies have become increasingly dependent on institutional investors for capital flow. 
Because of this resource dependence relationship, they have become vulnerable to institutional 
investors’ demands for greater returns, which may induce them to downsize more frequently 
(Useem 1996). This kind of resource dependence argument has been frequently made but rarely 
directly tested. In this paper, I provide a thorough empirical test for the argument. In conducting 
this test, however, I find that the resource dependence argument does not hold in its simple form; 
that is, not all institutional investors are equally capable of pressuring firms to downsize. Instead, 20 
 
I show that only blockholding institutions (those that hold a large block of a firm’s stock) or 
pressure-resistant institutions (those that invulnerable to counter-pressure from corporate 
managers) can exert significant influence over firms’ decision to downsize.  
My second and equally important claim provides a mechanism of persuasion encouraging 
managerial embrace of the shareholder-value paradigm. Even taking into account the different 
levels of influence that different types of institutional investors hold, external pressure from 
institutional investors alone is unlikely to explain the increasing prevalence of downsizing. In the 
end, it is managers who make the decision to downsize, and they tend to resist external pressure, 
especially when it comes to strategic decisions such as downsizing (Oliver 1991). Before the 
1980s, managers engaged in downsizing only reluctantly (Budros 1999, p. 78), given that, at the 
time, expanding the size of a firm was the hallmark of successful management. The recent 
prevalence of downsizing suggests that managers now have somehow embraced the shareholder-
value paradigm and have actively engaged in downsizing in order to enhance share price. Hence, 
building on Fligstein’s (1990; 2001) theory of conceptions of control, I suggest a second 
mechanism that encourages managers to embrace the shareholder-value paradigm. Shifts in the 
dominant management paradigm reshape the behavior of managers, I argue, by changing the 
context in which managers make important decisions, which I term decision context.  In the 
present case, the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm has led to a new decision context in 
which managers have stronger incentives to maximize shareholder value. Crucial to constructing 
such a decision context has been a set of prescriptions for reforming corporate governance, 
prescriptions which were originally formulated by agency theorists in financial economics and 
which were thereafter promoted by the financial community (Dobbin and Jung 2010).  21 
 
My analysis of downsizing announcements, drawing on a sample of 714 large, publicly-
held companies between 1981 and 2006, shows that both the pressure from institutional investors 
and the new decision context encouraged firms to downsize more frequently. By demonstrating 
the role of institutional investors in promoting downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy, 
especially blockholding and pressure-resistant ones that are likely to overcome resistance from 
corporate managers, my findings emphasize the importance of agency and power in institutional 
change. At the same time, my findings about the new decision context also suggest that change 
agents themselves are socially constructed by the prevailing management paradigm. Managers 
initially resisted shareholder primacy, but within the changed decision context, they have become 
agents of shareholder value and in the process have reinvented workforce downsizing as a 
solution to managing shareholder value and sending to investors their commitment to increasing 
value.  
 
2.1  WORKFORCE DOWNSIZING AS A SHAREHOLDER-VALUE STRATEGY 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the postwar business-labor social contract disintegrated.  This was  
important because prior to this disintegration, employees of large American companies in 
primary business sectors had enjoyed a fairly high degree of job security and career stability 
(Kalleberg 2009). Before the 1980s, employers and unions had set the rules governing various 
aspects of employment relations, including wages, benefits, working hours, and job descriptions 
(Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994). These informal rules, however, had come under severe 
strain beginning in the late 1970s (Osterman 1999). Faced with fierce foreign as well as domestic 
competition, U.S. companies experienced a severe drop in profitability and thus were less willing 
to make concessions to labor. In addition, automation and computerization had begun to replace 22 
 
human labor, thus further weakening the bargaining power of labor unions. In addition to these 
changes, the norm of shareholder primacy accelerated the collapse of the postwar business-labor 
social contract. Employers attempted to drastically revamp their postwar employment practices 
in the interest of maximizing shareholder value (Batt and Appelbaum 2010; Jacoby 2008; 
Kochan forthcoming).   
The prevalence of downsizing is one prominent indication of the revamping of postwar 
employment practice driven by the norm of shareholder primacy (Osterman 1999). In the 
changed economic and political context since the 1980s, which has been characterized by the 
growing influence of investors who demand maximum returns on their investment, workforce 
downsizing has become reconstructed as a means to enhance a firm’s stock price (Budros 1997; 
2002; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000). In a book that popularized the 
business-process-reengineering movement, Hammer and Champy (1993) championed 
downsizing as an effective means to eliminate non-value adding work and thus to achieve 
immediate cost savings. Allured by this prospect, poorly-performing firms have engaged in 
massive workforce downsizing in order to achieve a quick turnaround, even though the 
likelihood of such a turnaround was very low (Cascio, Young, and Morris 1997; De Meuse, 
Vanderheiden, and Bergmann 1994; Guthrie and Datta 2008; Love and Nohria 2005). 
Moreover, even well-performing firms do downsize to boost share price and satisfy 
shareholders (Cappelli 1999; Osterman 1999). In 1997, Kimberly-Clark eliminated 5,000 jobs in 
a bid to push the company closer toward achieving management’s goal of doubling earnings per 
share between 1995 and 2000 (Langreth 1997). In another example, Dell Computer, after failing 
to meet Wall Street analysts’ earnings forecasts for the fourth fiscal quarter of 2000 (it earned 18 
cents per share while securities analysts had expected 25 cents per share), announced its 23 
 
intention to cut 1,700 jobs to improve profit margins (Gaither 2001). In yet another example, 
Alcoa planned to cut 6,700 jobs in 2006; while the company made record earnings in the first 
three quarters of that year, the CEO stated that the company needed to take the “difficult but 
necessary” steps to move forward (Glader 2006).  
 
2.2  TWO EXPLANATIONS: RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND DECISION 
CONTEXT 
What accounts for this transformation of downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy? Both 
resource dependence theory and Fligstein’s theory of conceptions of control provide crucial 
explanations. Resource dependence theory suggests that firms’ growing dependence on 
institutional investors for capital flow makes them susceptible to those investors’ demand for 
greater returns on their investment, which may induce them to downsize more frequently. 
Further developing this explanation, I suggest that such pressure from institutional investors is 
most effective when they are blockholders and resistant to counter-pressure from corporate 
managers. Fligstein’s theory of conceptions of control provides a second explanation. It suggests 
that shifts in the dominant conception of control reorient the behavior of managers. Further 
developing this explanation, I argue that such reorientation in managerial behavior can occur 
because of a change in decision context. In this case, proponents of the shareholder-value 
paradigm have changed the decision context in a way that incentivizes managers to pursue 
strategies that enhance shareholder value, such as downsizing.   
 
2.2.1  Resource Dependence and External Pressure from Institutional Investors 
Resource dependence theory suggests that external resource providers can exert considerable 
influence over an organization (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The influence that one organization 24 
 
can exert over another is defined as a function of the latter’s dependence on the former for 
critical resources (Emerson 1962). Capital dependence theory, a variant of resource dependence 
theory, applies this fundamental argument to the analysis of the modern corporation, focusing on 
“corporations’ historically contingent capital-dependent relationship to the political, economic, 
and ideological dimensions of their institutional environment” (Prechel 2000, p. 10). According 
to the theory, a crucial feature of capital dependence since the 1980s has been “the change from 
debt to equity financing” (Prechel and Morris 2010, p. 341; see also Davis and Mizruchi 1999). 
Heavy corporate reliance on equity financing has empowered institutional investors, who have 
come to control a large block of a firm’s stock (Davis and Thompson 1994; Useem 1996). “This 
historical contingency,” Prechel and Morris argue, “increased institutional investors’ power, 
which in some respects made corporate management more vulnerable to external influences” 
(Prechel and Morris 2010, p. 341). Unlike banks, which are satisfied as long as a debt is repaid, 
institutional investors have pressured corporate management to enhance profits and stock 
performance, creating incentives for corporate managers to maximize shareholder value. 
As a result, it is argued, firms may be more likely to conduct downsizing to enhance 
profits under the oversight of these investors (Useem 1996). Although few studies have directly 
tested this relationship between investor pressure and downsizing in the United States, 
Ahmadjian and Robbins’s (2005) study of downsizing in Japan demonstrates that ownership by 
foreign institutional investors (mostly from the U.S.) significantly increases the rate of 
downsizing. If institutional investors exert influence abroad, they should have similar or even 
greater influence in the U.S., where the politico-legal environment is considered more permissive 
of job cuts (Weiler 1990). Other studies, however, suggest that there may be limits to the direct 
influence of institutional investors. While a firm’s dependence on institutional investors may be a 25 
 
necessary condition for the latter’s influence over the former, it may not be a sufficient one. For 
one thing, managers often resist or manipulate external pressure (Oliver 1991). Indeed, previous 
studies demonstrate that there is considerable variation across different types of institutional 
investors in terms of their ability to influence management.  
There are two main sources of this variation. The first is the size of holdings. Some 
studies have cast doubt on the ability of institutional investors to impose substantive reforms on 
firms, for most of them hold only a small portion of a firm’s stock and may thus be reluctant or 
unable to challenge management (Coffee 1991; Davis and Kim 2007). Instead, it is suggested, 
only blockholding institutions have both the power and incentive to challenge managers (Hartzell 
and Starks 2003; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989). In addition, unlike 
smallholders, blockholders cannot simply vote with their feet when dissatisfied with 
management, because it is hard to liquidate large chunks of shares without further depressing 
stock value (Coffee 1991; but see also Davis 2008). Hence, when stuck with an underperforming 
firm, blockholding institutions are often left with only one option, that is, pressuring managers to 
restore profitability. Such pressure may encourage managers to downsize.  
Hypothesis 1-1: Ownership by blockholding institutions will increase the rate of workforce 
downsizing. 
The second main source of variation is institutional investors’ vulnerability to count-
pressure from corporate managers. Some institutions are pressure-sensitive, i.e., vulnerable to 
such pressure, while others are pressure-resistant. One important factor determining their 
vulnerability is an institutional fund manager’s current or potential business ties to firms. 
Investors with such ties are unlikely to challenge management (Brickley, Lease, and Smith 1988; 
Coffee 1991; David, Kochhar, and Levitas 1998; Davis and Kim 2007). For instance, 26 
 
commercial banks and insurance companies are least willing to challenge corporate management, 
because they may lose business with the firms (Coffee 1991). Mutual funds have a similar 
conflict of interest; for instance, some mutual funds (e.g., Fidelity) sell pension instruments to 
companies (Davis and Kim 2007). Unlike these other institutions, public pension funds have 
almost no opportunity to earn fees or income from companies. Hence, they have been most 
active in pressuring management, sponsoring anti-management proxy proposals and pressuring 
managers through private negotiations (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998; Del Guercio and 
Hawkins 1999; Gillan and Starks 2000). I expect that although they may not always directly 
pressure firms to downsize, their demand for greater returns on their investment can still 
encourage downsizing. 
Hypothesis 1-2: Ownership by pressure-resistant institutions (i.e., public pension funds) will 
increase the rate of workforce downsizing. 
These two hypotheses concerning the influence of blockholding and pressure-resistant 
institutions suggest that smallholding and pressure-sensitive institutions are unlikely to have a 
similarly positive influence over downsizing. In fact, I note, such institutions might even be 
expected to have a negative influence. Without having much influence over management, they 
typically choose to divest at the first sign of poor management. One study examining 
institutional investors’ reaction to announcements of a forced CEO turnover shows that such 
investors sell even before such announcements are actually made (Parrino, Sias, and Starks 
2003). Although downsizing may improve a firm’s profitability in the near future, it can also 
have an immediate negative effect on the firm’s earnings and thus its stock price, because 
downsizing often necessitates significant restructuring costs, such as lump-sum severance 
payments. Hence, if smallholding and pressure-sensitive institutions sell even before downsizing 27 
 
plans are publicly announced, the resulting sudden drop in ownership by such institutions can 
generate a spurious negative relationship between their ownership and the rate of downsizing. 
 
2.2.2  New Decision Context and Reorientation of Managerial Behavior 
While resource dependence theory provides a coercive mechanism for downsizing, through 
pressure from institutional investors, Fligstein’s (1990; 2001) theory of conceptions of control 
provides an additional explanation of persuasion, through reorientation in managerial behavior 
towards shareholder-value maximization. Fligstein posits that, at each historical moment, there is 
a dominant model of the firm, one that defines the right relationship among key stakeholders and 
appropriate strategies that firms should pursue in the interests of these stakeholders. Fligstein 
(1990) further suggests that shifts in the dominant conception of control reorient the behavior of 
firms and managers. For example, he shows that the shift from a conception of control that views 
the firm as a production function to a conception that views the firm as a portfolio of investment 
gave rise to a growth strategy through diversification in the 1960s and 1970s. This strategy was 
largely abandoned in the 1980s, however, when the viability of the firm-as-portfolio model was 
severely undermined by the newly emergent financial doctrine that investors, not firms, should 
diversify (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994).  
But how do shifts in the dominant conception of control change the behavior of managers? 
Fligstein argues that such change occurs through intra-firm power struggles among managerial 
groups with different strategic orientations. A shift in the dominant conception of control tends 
to change intra-firm power bases of different groups, pushing those with strategic orientations 
most congruent with the prevailing conception of control to the top (Fligstein 1987; Ocasio and 
Kim 1999; Thornton and Ocasio 1999). Fligstein’s studies show that the firm-as-the-portfolio 28 
 
model favored managers with a background in finance, who came to control many prominent 
companies and actively pursued the diversification strategy in the 1960s and 1970s (Fligstein 
1985; 1987; Fligstein and Brantley 1992). The decline of the firm-as-portfolio model, however, 
weakened the intra-firm power base of financial managers, which led to the abandonment of the 
diversification strategy (Ocasio and Kim 1999).  
Building on Fligstein’s explanation, I suggest that a shift in the dominant conception of 
control can also occur through the efforts of external groups to change the decision context in 
which managers make and implement key strategic decisions. I argue that this better explains 
how the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm has reshaped the behavior of managers in general 
and their behavior with respect to downsizing in particular. Differing from previous shifts in the 
dominant conception of control, the primary tension resulting from the shift to the shareholder-
value conception was not among internal agents (i.e., managers) but between agents and 
principals—that is, managers who were mostly interested in enlarging the size of firms and 
shareholders who wanted maximum returns on their investment. As the prosperity of the postwar 
years came to an end in the 1970s, culminating in stagflation and bear markets, many large U.S. 
companies experienced a steady decline in their market share and profitability. This stimulated 
emerging power groups in financial markets, e.g., institutional investors, to search for a remedy. 
These external groups promoted new corporate strategies for enhancing profitability and share 
price (Davis et al. 1994; Useem 1996; Zorn et al. 2004; Zuckerman 2000). They imposed such 
strategies upon management using their market power, but they also did so by changing the 
decision context in a way that induced managers to pursue profit maximization, and thus to 
implement many of those new strategies, including downsizing.  29 
 
Agency theory, a branch of financial economics, has played an important role in 
constructing this new decision context. Agency theorists argue that managers, who typically hold 
little stake in the firm, have insufficient incentive to maximize profit (Fama 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In the 1960s and the 1970s, they were busy diversifying their firms to expand 
the size of their empires and to raise their salaries, without increasing shareholder wealth 
(Amihud and Lev 1981; Jensen 1986). Agency theorists not only diagnosed these problems but 
also provided ready remedies, by means of practitioner outlets such as Harvard Business Review 
(e.g., Jensen 1984; 1989) that contributed to the theory’s ascendance in the financial community. 
Agency theorists called for broader governance reforms to ensure that managers would pursue 
value maximization.  
Three such reforms became prominent. First of all, to minimize agency costs, agency 
theorists prescribed that managers should become owners: “If the manager of a firm owned 100 
percent of the firm’s shares, then … the decisions made by that manager would be presumed to 
be those that maximize long-run shareholder value …” (Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck 2004, p. 21). 
While this is practically impossible, the board still can tie the wealth of the firm’s executives to 
that of shareholders, for instance by granting executive stock options (Jensen and Murphy 1990). 
Agency theorists also attributed the agency problems of the 1960s and the 1970s to the failure of 
an internal monitoring system—the board of directors (Jensen 1993, p. 862). As a remedy, they 
called for boards to be composed mostly of outside directors. Finally, agency theorists argued 
that firms should increase financial transparency, so that investors could assess their prospects 
(Jensen et al. 2004). For that purpose, management consultants advised firms to have a financial 
specialist on the top management team—a chief financial officer (Zorn 2004).  30 
 
Existing studies point to the importance of academic theories in shaping the behavior of 
managers (Khurana 2007; Strang and Meyer 1993). Performativity theory, for instance, suggests 
that market participants perform their roles as set out by theories they believe in (Callon 1998; 
Mackenzie and Millo 2003). Although it is unlikely that firms in this case have simply performed 
according to agency-theory prescriptions, all three agency-theory prescriptions mentioned above 
have been widely adopted. Since the 1980s, executive compensation has steadily increased, and 
much of the increase has been driven by stock options (Dobbin and Jung 2010; Yermack 1995). 
There have also been significant improvements in board monitoring in that most boards are now 
dominated by outside directors (Gordon 2007). Finally, by the end of the 1990s, most Fortune 
500 firms had hired a CFO or similar executive (Rao and Sivakumar 1999; Zorn 2004).  
One reason that corporations have embraced agency-theory prescriptions is that 
institutional investors have actively advocated for them. While they have put direct pressure 
upon firms to boost profits, they have also been interested in improving the broader corporate 
governance structure of firms, by pushing for a set of agency-theory prescriptions (Dobbin and 
Jung 2012). Public pension funds have led the charge, sponsoring an array of shareholder 
proposals to improve board governance, executive compensation, and financial transparency 
(Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). For instance, in 1985, the 
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) led the Council of Institutional 
Investors (CII), bringing together public, private, and union fund managers, whose “shareholder 
bill of rights” called for greater shareholder input to reduce agency costs (Jacoby 2007). As firms 
have adopted these agency-theory prescriptions, they have constructed a decision context in 
which stock-price-enhancing actions are rewarded, while stock-price-reducing ones are punished.  31 
 
I argue that in this changed decision context, workforce downsizing has become an 
accepted strategy to enhance stock price. Previous studies have shown that equity-based 
compensation practices create incentives for managers to pursue profit maximization (Burns and 
Kedia 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007; Sanders and Hambrick 2007; Zhang et al. 
2008). Hence, firms with option-loaded chief executives may be likely to engage in downsizing 
more frequently as they aim at greater profits. Studies have also shown that independent boards 
are more likely to fire CEOs of poorly-performing firms and replace them with outsiders (Huson, 
Parrino, and Starks 2001; Weisbach 1988). Managers may thus become more conscious of profit 
maximization under the monitoring of independent boards, which in turn may induce them to 
downsize. Finally, whereas financial managers used to perform back-office functions like 
bookkeeping and preparation of tax documents, as CFOs they are deeply involved in making key 
strategic decisions. As cost experts, they have pushed for strategies that, they believe, cut costs 
and thereby boost profits. Workforce downsizing is one such strategy.  
Hypothesis 2-1: Stock option grants to CEOs will increase the rate of workforce downsizing.  
Hypothesis 2-2: Board independence will increase the rate of workforce downsizing. 
Hypothesis 2-3: The presence of a CFO will increase the rate of workforce downsizing. 
 
2.3  DATA AND METHOD 
To test my arguments, I analyze downsizing announcements made by 714 large publicly-held 
U.S. corporations from 1981 to 2006, using a continuous-time event history analysis, which uses 
a fine-grained duration measure, and thus is better able to capture temporal dynamics than a 
discrete-time model. I utilize a fixed-effects version of the Cox model, the Cox model with 
stratification on subjects (Allison 1996). The Cox model is a widely used method for continuous-32 
 
time event history analysis, and the fixed-effect estimator allows more rigorous causal inferences 
by controlling for unobserved firm-specific characteristics that are stable over time. I assemble a 
comprehensive set of variables that are known to affect a firm’s decision to downsize. In 
particular, previous studies show that most firms downsize reactively, in response to declining 
profitability or stock price (Budros 1997). My analysis demonstrates the proactive nature of 
recent workforce downsizings; even after controlling for prior financial performance, pressures 
from shareholder groups and shareholder-value prescriptions significantly increase the rate of 
workforce downsizing.  
 
2.3.1  Sample  
The original sample included 789 large U.S. companies that were traded between 1965 and 2006. 
Most longitudinal studies of large firms use samples drawn in a single year (typically at the 
midpoint). Studies based on such samples may suffer from survivorship bias, because these 
samples become biased toward successful firms in later years. To overcome this problem, my 
collaborators in data collection and I sampled firms evenly across the entire period so as to 
include firms in growing as well as declining industries. We sampled systematically, within 
industries, with replacement when a firm already appeared in the sample. The sampling frame is 
Fortune’s list of America’s largest firms, supplemented by information from Dun’s Million 
Dollar Directory for selected industries. We stratified the sample by industry, selecting a roughly 
equal number of firms from 23 industries.
3 The majority of industries (16 out of 23) were 
sampled exclusively from the Fortune Industrial 500. Some sectors, however, such as 
communications, utilities, transportation, wholesale and retail, service, health care, and 
entertainment, are not included in this list. For entertainment and health care, we used Dun & 
                                                 
3 See Footnote 1.   33 
 
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory for years before 1983, at which point Fortune began to 
cover these industries. For the present study, I use data on 714 firms that were publicly traded 
between the third quarter of 1981 and the fourth quarter of 2006.  
 
2.3.2  Dependent Variable: Downsizing Announcements 
I collected information on the history of downsizing announcements for the 714 firms in my 
sample between 1981 and 2006. Following Budros (1999), I define downsizing as permanent 
personnel reduction. This definition excludes announcements of temporary layoffs and sales of 
assets. Data on downsizing announcements were obtained through extensive archival search. The 
primary source was the Lexis/Nexis electronic database. The database catalogues most major 
newspapers, such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, and several newswire 
services. Rather than limiting sources to one or two major newspapers—a tactic that previous 
studies have adopted—I used all possible sources, including local newspapers. Cases that 
referred to downsizing plans announced earlier were dropped. Ultimately, 5,843 announcements 
were identified. Some may question the validity of my measure of downsizing activity, because 
announcements of downsizing may not lead to actual workforce reductions (Budros 1997, p. 
235-36). To check the validity of my measure, I analyzed whether firms actually implemented 
their announced downsizing plans. The result shows that after announcing their downsizing plans, 
firms, on average, reduced their workforce size by about 3.3 percent. More than 60 percent of 
firms that announced a downsizing plan in the previous year reduced their workforce by at least 
one percent.  
 
2.3.3  Independent Variables 34 
 
I have two sets of key explanatory variables, one for the resource dependence explanation and 
the other for my argument of the new decision context. A firm’s dependence on institutional 
investors is measured by the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors. Data 
on institutional ownership were obtained from Thomson Financial’s institutional ownership 
database. To compare the influence of blockholding and smallholding institutions, I divide the 
overall institutional ownership into three parts, one by blockholders (those holding more than 5 
percent of a firm’s stock), another by intermediate holders (those holding between 1 and 5 
percent), and finally one by smallholders (those holding less than 1 percent).  This 5 percent 
threshold for blockholders has been widely used in other studies (e.g., Hambrick and Finkelstein 
1995; Salancik and Pfeffer 1980; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989). To compare the influence of 
pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutions, I divide the overall institutional ownership 
into 5 different pieces, each by different types of institutions including banks, insurance 
companies, investment companies (i.e., mutual funds), investment advisors, and public pension 
funds. Among them, the first three—banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds—are often 
regarded as pressure-sensitive in the literature, while public pension funds are seen as pressure-
resistant. The remaining category, investment advisors, is not clearly defined as either in the 
literature, and so I leave it as an indeterminate category.   
I construct another set of measures for agency-theory prescriptions to account for the 
changed decision context. First of all, the extent to which a firm’s CEO is compensated with 
stock options is measured using the ratio of stock-option to total compensation. I also include 
total CEO compensation. Because Compustat’s Execomp database began to report stock option 
values, calculated using the Black-Scholes-Merton method, in 1992, I explore the effects of 
compensation in separate models, with a one-year lag, for 1993-2005. Second, board 35 
 
independence is measured by the percentage of outside directors on the board. Outside directors 
are defined as any directors not employed by the firm. Information for this variable is taken from 
Standard & Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives. Finally, the presence of 
a CFO is measured as a binary variable, coded as one when a firm has a CFO. Information for 
these two variables is taken from Standard & Poor’s Register.  
 
2.3.4  Control Variables 
I include several control variables that have previously been shown to affect a firm’s decision to 
downsize. Table 2.1 presents data sources for each variable along with descriptive statistics. 
Some variables included in the analyses vary annually, and others vary quarterly. They are 
lagged so that they reflect the state in the previous fiscal year or quarter.  
First of all, I control for a given firm’s performance prior to downsizing. For operating 
performance, I include return on assets (ROA). For stock-market performance, I include 
cumulative stock returns over three months (change in share price). Investment in new 
technology is measured using a firm’s net expenditure in property, plant, and equipment (PPE) 
per employee. Debt burden is measured by debt-to-equity ratio. To account for the possibility 
that workforce downsizing follows other restructuring moves, I include the number of 
acquisitions and divestitures completed by the focal firm in the previous fiscal quarter. Corporate 
strategy also matters. Firms that pursue a focused strategy often shed jobs as they get rid of non-
core businesses. To account for this, the degree of diversification is included, measured using the 
entropy index (Palepu 1985). Some firms engage in downsizing to avoid unwanted takeover 
attempts. To account for this, an indicator variable is included when a given firm was the target 
of an unwanted takeover bid in the previous quarter. Three binary variables for CEO functional    36 
 
   
Data Source Mean S.D.
CEO Options/Comp. Execomp 0.330 0.267
Board Independence S&P Registers 75.646 13.409
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) S&P Registers 0.618 0.486
Institutional Ownership (IO) Thomson Fin. 51.545 21.384
IO by Blockholders Thomson Fin. 10.602 11.725
IO by Intermediate Holders Thomson Fin. 21.653 11.225
IO by Smallholders Thomson Fin. 19.290 9.949
IO by Banks Thomson Fin. 11.614 7.111
IO by Insurance Companies Thomson Fin. 4.269 3.948
IO by Investment Companies Thomson Fin. 9.703 9.270
IO by Investment Advisors Thomson Fin. 21.905 12.501
IO by Public Pension Funds Thomson Fin. 2.490 2.043
CEO Compensation Execomp 8.153 1.022
Cumulative Stock Returns CRSP 0.037 0.189
Return on Assets (ROA) Compustat 0.907 2.185
Net Investment in Fixed Assets Compustat 3.957 1.346
Debt-to-Equity Compustat 0.536 0.480
Acquisitions SDC Platinum 0.019 0.142
Divestitures SDC Platinum 0.155 0.505
Diversification SDC Platinum 0.003 0.051
Hostile Takeover Bid SDC Platinum 0.615 0.535
CEO Background: Finance Who's Who in Finance 0.192 0.394
CEO Background: Production Who's Who in Finance 0.199 0.399
CEO Background: Operations Who's Who in Finance 0.258 0.438
Number of Employees Compustat 2.841 1.207
Total Assets Compustat 7.827 1.538
Within-Industry Downsizing Density 0.491 0.435
Industry Growth Rate Compustat 10.595 202.754
Union Coverage Unionstat.com 20.978 14.587
Quarterly Change in CPI U.S. Dept. of Commerce 0.831 0.555
Recessionary Period Burea of Labor Statistics 0.234 0.423
Annual Time-Trend 12.096 7.311
Table 2.1: Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics37 
 
backgrounds are also included: (1) finance, (2) engineering or production, and (3) operations. 
Firm size is measured as both the size of a given firm’s total assets and the number of employees. 
Several important aspects of macroeconomic or institutional contexts are also considered. 
Density of downsizing is measured as the percentage of firms within the focal firm’s industry, 
minus the focal firm, that announced downsizing plans in the previous year. Industry growth rate 
is measured as the percentage change in the aggregate sales for each 2-digit SIC industry the firm 
operates in. Aggregate sales were calculated using information for all companies in Compustat. 
Quarter-to-quarter changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) tap overall macro economic 
conditions. An indicator variable for recessionary periods (1990-1991 and 2000-2001) is 
included. An annual time-trend variable is included to capture the effect of unmeasured secular 
trends. Last but not least, a measure of unionization at the industry level is included (see Hirsch 
and Macpherson 2003).  
 
2.3.5  Missing Values and Multiple Imputation  
For some financial variables, missing values are of concern. The most severe case is the ROA 
variable; for about 15 percent of all quarterly intervals, this information is not available. For all 
the other variables, the rate of missing data is less than 5 percent. When data are missing for non-
random reasons, list-wise deletion can yield biased estimates (Allison 2002). To address this 
problem, I estimated missing values for these variables using a multiple imputation program, 
Amelia II (King et al. 2001). Results are robust to the exclusion of organization-years for which 
there are missing data. 
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2.3.6  Modeling Procedure 
I analyze downsizing announcements between the first fiscal quarter of 1981 and the fourth fiscal 
quarter of 2006. For each announcement, I obtained information on the exact date of its 
occurrence. Hence, the metric for duration time is day, which is fine-grained enough to allow me 
to use continuous-time event history models rather than discrete–time models. Announcement 
spells are defined as the time intervals between announcements; in other words, the duration time 
is reset to zero every time an event occurs. Since firms in the sample typically made more than 
one downsizing announcement, the total number of announcement spells exceeds the number of 
firms. In most cases, the first spell is left-truncated. For these left-truncated spells (457 spells 
about 10 percent of the entire set), the beginning point was set to January 1st, 1980. Since this 
procedure can lead to biased estimates, I conducted a robustness check by estimating models 
without those spells whose beginning was set to January 1, 1980. This is the most common 
method for addressing the problem of left-truncation (Singer and Willett 2003). The results are 
qualitatively the same.  
Covariates are updated on a quarterly basis. To do so, I split each announcement spell 
into quarterly intervals. Each quarterly interval starts at the date of quarterly earnings report and 
ends immediately prior to the next quarterly earnings report. Specifically, at each date of a firm’s 
quarterly earnings announcement, I note whether the firm meets or beats the consensus analyst 
forecast and update information on explanatory and control variables. Next, I observe whether or 
not the firm makes a downsizing announcement. If no announcement occurs until the next 
quarterly earnings report, I update information on variables at that point and repeat the same 
process. If an announcement occurs within the quarterly interval, however, I record the duration 
time since the beginning of the given announcement spell and start another spell.  39 
 
I use a Cox regression model for estimation. One important advantage of Cox regression 
over other parametric models is that one does not have to choose some particular probability 
distribution to represent survival times. Without having much prior knowledge, any choice of the 
functional form for the baseline hazard function would be arbitrary. Instead, the Cox regression 
model lets the data determine the shape of the hazard function (Singer and Willett 2003). This is 
preferable for the present research. Like most social science research, the present research is 
chiefly concerned with the relationship between the outcome and covariates of theoretical 
interest and less concerned with the specific form of the duration dependency, which can be 
sensitive to the posited model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, p. 47).  
The repeatability of the event under study requires special treatment; there can be 
dependence among the multiple observations from the same unit, arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity (Allison 1995, p. 240). To address this issue, I use fixed-effects Cox regression, 
which lets announcement spells from a firm share the same baseline hazard function. Allison 
(Allison 1996, p. 220) suggests that, under conditions of moderate censoring, the fixed-effects 
estimator is more suitable for handling repeatable events than conventional single-event 
approaches. One shortfall of this approach is that it drops subjects with no events, that is, those 
with only a single right-censored spell as well as subjects with one uncensored spell and one 
censored spell, if the censored spell is shorter than the uncensored spell (Allison 2005, p. 116). 
An alternative approach, which does not exclude firms experiencing no event, is the conditional 
frailty model—the Cox model with the frailty term (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). This 
model is basically a random-effects model and thus has the same strengths and weaknesses. Like 
other random-effects models, it assumes no correlation between the random effect and covariates 
in the model. If this assumption holds, it is more efficient (i.e., the estimated standard errors are 40 
 
smaller) than a fixed-effects Cox model, but if not, the resulting estimates can be biased and 
inconsistent. Despite potential loss of data and efficiency, however, I draw primarily on the 
results of the fixed-effects Cox model, because it enables one to make a more stringent causal 
argument than the random-effects model, by accounting for all unobserved subject-specific 
characteristics that do not vary over time (Allison 2005, p. 112). Finally, tied event times are 
handled using the Efron method (Efron 1977). 
 
2.4  RESULTS 
Figure 1 plots the frequency of downsizing announcements by firms in my sample between 1981 
and 2006. Firms still engage in workforce downsizing during economic downturns, but there are 
also a couple of new trends to be noted. First, workforce downsizing has generally become more 
frequent in the latter period. There were more downsizings during the recession in the early 
2000s than during the recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, firms continued to 
downsize throughout the 1990s, despite an improving economy. Hence, there is a significant 
negative correlation between GDP growth and downsizing frequency (-0.551; p<0.05), but it 
becomes tenuous after the 1980s (-0.203; p>0.05). If only years in the 1990s are considered, the 
correlation becomes close to zero (0.086; p>0.05).  
The fixed-effects Cox models of downsizing announcements reported in Table 2.2 test 
both the resource-dependence hypotheses and the decision-context hypotheses. Models 1 through 
6 cover the entire period from 1981 to 2006. Models 7 through 9 cover the sub-period between 
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Figure 2.1: Downsizing Announcements 
Note: Frequency is calculated as the number of downsizing announcements divided by the number of companies in 
the sample, each quarter; GDP percent change is based on 2005 dollars.  
 
1993 and 2006, because executive compensation variables are only available, with a one-year lag, 
from 1993. Models 1 and 7 are baseline models with only control variables. Models 2 through 4 
test the resource-dependence hypotheses with variables of institutional ownership. Models 5, 6, 8, 
and 9 test the decision-context hypotheses with variables of agency theory prescriptions. 
Likelihood ratio tests show that, in all cases, adding these key explanatory variables significantly 
improves model fit over that of baseline models.  
 
2.4.1  Resource-Dependence Predictions 
The results in Table 2.2 support the resource-dependence hypotheses. In Model 2, the overall 
institutional ownership is negatively related to the hazard rate of downsizing announcements,  
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Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Direct Power
Institutional Ownership 0.002 (0.001)
 By Inst. Holding Less Than 1% -0.038*** (0.003)
 By Insti. Holding b/w 1% and 5% 0.008*** (0.002)
 By Insti. Holding More Than 5% 0.009*** (0.002)
 By Banks -0.029*** (0.003)
 By Insurance Companies -0.013* (0.006)
 By Investment Companies 0.013*** (0.002)
 By Investment Advisors 0.005* (0.002)
 By Public Pensions 0.044*** (0.010)
Indirect Power
Board Independence
Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
CEO Options/Comp.
Control Variables
Cumulative Stock Returns -1.011*** (0.083) -1.014*** (0.083) -1.024*** (0.082) -1.034*** (0.083)
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.074*** (0.006) -0.074*** (0.006) -0.066*** (0.007) -0.073*** (0.006)
Net Investment in Fixed Assets 0.262*** (0.061) 0.267*** (0.061) 0.268*** (0.061) 0.229*** (0.061)
Debt-to-Equity -0.064 (0.041) -0.060 (0.041) -0.151*** (0.042) -0.075 (0.041)
Acquisitions 0.384*** (0.083) 0.384*** (0.083) 0.416*** (0.083) 0.392*** (0.083)
Divestitures 0.071** (0.022) 0.071** (0.022) 0.063** (0.022) 0.069** (0.022)
Number of Employees 1.147*** (0.071) 1.164*** (0.072) 1.217*** (0.071) 1.253*** (0.074)
Total Assets 0.261*** (0.055) 0.237*** (0.058) 0.292*** (0.057) 0.143* (0.060)
Within-Industry Downsizing Density 0.754*** (0.042) 0.753*** (0.042) 0.725*** (0.043) 0.694*** (0.043)
Industry Growth Rate -0.003* (0.001) -0.003* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001)
Union Coverage -0.007** (0.002) -0.007** (0.002) -0.005* (0.002) -0.004 (0.002)
Quarterly Change in CPI -0.188*** (0.028) -0.186*** (0.029) -0.185*** (0.028) -0.175*** (0.029)
Recessionary Period 0.245*** (0.036) 0.249*** (0.036) 0.254*** (0.036) 0.277*** (0.036)
Log Likelihood
No. Quarterly Intervals
No. Announcement Events
No. Firms
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)
544 544 544 544
Table 2.2: Continuous-Time Event-History Analysis of Downsizing Announcments (Cox Model with Stratification by Firm)
1981-2006
46,823 46,823 46,823 46,823
5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
-20,163.209 -20,162.332 -20,051.632 -20,088.02243 
 
   
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Direct Power
Institutional Ownership
 By Inst. Holding Less Than 1% -0.039*** (0.003) -0.034*** (0.005)
 By Insti. Holding b/w 1% and 5% 0.006** (0.002) -0.002 (0.003)
 By Insti. Holding More Than 5% 0.008*** (0.002) 0.005* (0.002)
 By Banks -0.027*** (0.003) -0.023*** (0.005)
 By Insurance Companies -0.014* (0.006) -0.023** (0.007)
 By Investment Companies 0.010*** (0.002) -0.005 (0.003)
 By Investment Advisors 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
 By Public Pensions 0.040*** (0.010) 0.040* (0.016)
Indirect Power
Board Independence 0.015*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.003)
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 0.228*** (0.045) 0.223*** (0.045) 0.130 (0.071) 0.142* (0.071)
CEO Options/Comp. 0.214* (0.092) 0.223* (0.092)
Control Variables
Cumulative Stock Returns -1.039*** (0.082) -1.044*** (0.084) -0.903*** (0.103) -0.906*** (0.104)
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.066*** (0.006) -0.072*** (0.006) -0.071*** (0.009) -0.075*** (0.009)
Net Investment in Fixed Assets 0.261*** (0.060) 0.224*** (0.061) 0.538*** (0.096) 0.590*** (0.096)
Debt-to-Equity -0.148*** (0.042) -0.074 (0.041) 0.051 (0.052) 0.094 (0.052)
Acquisitions 0.447*** (0.084) 0.423*** (0.084) 0.515*** (0.097) 0.490*** (0.097)
Divestitures 0.063** (0.022) 0.069** (0.022) 0.045 (0.027) 0.057* (0.027)
Number of Employees 1.320*** (0.073) 1.330*** (0.075) 1.393*** (0.119) 1.375*** (0.120)
Total Assets 0.168** (0.059) 0.053 (0.061) -0.030 (0.091) -0.107 (0.092)
Within-Industry Downsizing Density 0.705*** (0.043) 0.681*** (0.043) 0.533*** (0.055) 0.537*** (0.055)
Industry Growth Rate -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001)
Union Coverage -0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.005 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
Quarterly Change in CPI -0.169*** (0.028) -0.162*** (0.029) -0.075 (0.040) -0.073 (0.039)
Recessionary Period 0.267*** (0.036) 0.284*** (0.036) 0.355*** (0.056) 0.379*** (0.056)
Log Likelihood
No. Quarterly Intervals
No. Announcement Events
No. Firms
Table 2.2 (Continued)
1981-2006 1993-2006
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
-20,006.653 -20,053.811 -10,949.957 -10,968.441
46,823 46,823 25,134 25,134
486 486
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)
3,749 3,749
544 544
5,787 5,78744 
 
which is contrary to the resource dependence argument that firms heavily dependent on 
institutional investors are likely to downsize more frequently. This significant negative effect of 
institutional ownership, however, conceals considerable variation across different categories of 
institutional investors. The first source of variation is the size of their holdings. In Model 3, I 
replace overall institutional ownership with ownership by blockholding, intermediate holding, 
and smallholding institutions. As I have predicted, ownership by blockholding institutions 
significantly increases the hazard rate, whereas ownership by smallholding institutions 
significantly decreases it. A similar kind of variation is observed for between pressure-resistant 
and pressure-sensitive institutions. In Model 4, I replace overall institutional ownership with 
ownership by five different categories. As I predicted, ownership by pressure-resistant 
institutions, that is public pension funds, significantly increases the hazard rate, whereas 
ownership by pressure-sensitive institutions, especially banks, significantly decreases it. 
While the considerable amount of variation across different types of institutional 
investors and the positive effects of ownership by blockholding and pressure-resistant 
institutions support my predictions, the negative effects of smallholding and pressure-sensitive 
institutions requires some explanation. Do these negative effects suggest that such institutions do 
not want firms to downsize and lobby managers not to do so? It is possbile that they may not be 
enthusiastic about downsizing. Downsizing might improve a firm’s profitability and thus its 
stock price in the intermediate and long run but could have an immediate, negative effect 
because downsizing often incurs significant restructuring costs, such as lump-sum severance 
payments to affected workers. But it is unlikely that smallholding or pressure-sensitive 
institutions would pressure firms not to downsize. What seems to happen instead is that they sell 45 
 
their holdings downsizing announcements, because rumors about possible downsizing 
announcements often widely circulate in the financial community.  
To see if this is the case, I ran supplementary analyses of institutional ownership with 
relevant predictor variables, one of which was an indicator of downsizing announcements in the 
previous three-month period. Figure 2.2 plots the coefficients for the indicator variable from the 
analyses. As suspected, smallholders tend to leave firms just before downsizing announcements, 
while blockholders do not. Similarly, pressure-sensitive institutions, especially banks, also tend 
to leave firms just before downsizing announcements, while pressure-resistant institutions, public 
pension funds, do not. Since the models in Table 2 are basically fixed-effects models and thus  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Changes in Institutional Ownership before Downsizing Announcements 
Note: Full models are presented in Appendix E. 
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use only within-firm variation, a sudden drop in ownership by either smallholding or pressure-
sensitive institutions just before a downsizing announcement could generate a spurious negative 
association between their ownership and the hazard rate of downsizing announcements.  
 
2.4.2  Decision-Context Predictions 
The results in Table 2.2 also support my decision-context hypotheses. Firms that adopted or 
implemented the three agency theory prescriptions engage in workforce downsizing more 
frequently. First, when a significant portion of the CEO’s compensation is equity-based through 
stock option grants, downsizing is more likely. The coefficient for the ratio of stock options to 
total CEO compensation is significantly positive in both Models 7 and 8. Specifically, every one 
percent increase in stock options increases the hazard rate of downsizing by roughly 0.4 percent. 
Note also that the overall level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the rate, 
suggesting that it is primarily the equity component of the compensation package that induces 
the CEO to adopt a downsizing plan. Second, the results in Models 5 and 6 also support 
Hypothesis 2-2 that outside directors significantly increase the risk of downsizing. The 
coefficient for the board-independence variable is 0.008 in Model 5 and 0.009 in Model 6, both 
significant at the 0.1 percent level. More concretely, given that the average board had about 12 
directors during the study period, replacing one inside director with an outside director (i.e., 
about 8 percent increase in board independence) increases the hazard rate by about 7 percent. 
Finally, the results in Models 5 and 6 support Hypothesis 2-3 that firms with CFOs will engage 
in workforce downsizing more frequently. Having a CFO increases the hazard rate by 12 percent 
in Model 5 and by 13 percent in Model 6. 
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2.4.3  Control Variables 
A number of control variables show the expected effects. Both operating and stock-market 
performance decrease the rate of workforce downsizing. It also occurs more frequently after both 
acquisitions and divestitures. The degree of diversification also has a significant effect; 
diversified firms downsize less frequently. There is also evidence that firms that become targets 
of hostile takeover attempts are more likely to downsize. As for CEOs’ functional backgrounds, 
those with a background in finance seem most willing to engage in downsizing. Both workforce 
size and the number of establishments increase the rate of downsizing, while asset size decreases 
it. As for environmental factors, the density of downsizing significantly increases the frequency 
of downsizing by the focal firm, probably reflecting some kind of contagion effect. Firms in 
declining industries engage in downsizing more frequently. Finally, union coverage has no 
significant effect on the hazard rate. Its coefficient has a positive sign but is not significant.  
 
2.4.4  Robustness Checks 
First, I did a robustness check without the left-truncated announcement spells. The results appear 
very similar to those in Table 2.2, except that the significance level for ownership by public 
pension funds and the presence of a CFO is reduced in Models 4 through 6. This appears to 
occur because, by dropping left-truncated spells, these models do not capture well the earlier part 
of the observation period. In fact, the model for the period after 1993 looks essentially the same. 
Second, because the fixed-effects estimator only includes subjects experiencing the event at least 
once, 99 firms with no announcement events are excluded, as well as 49 additional firms with 
one uncensored spell and one censored spell, because their censored spell is shorter than the 
uncensored one (Allison 2005, p. 115). In the end, 56 announcement spells are not used, which is 48 
 
about 1 percent of the entire announcement spells. To see if excluding these spells affects the 
results, I replicated the models in Table 2.2 using the Cox model with the frailty term. The 
results are very similar for most key explanatory variables. 
 
2.5  CONCLUSION 
Frustrated by the lackluster performance of leading U.S. companies in the 1970s, institutional 
fund managers have since sought to change the way firms are run. Throughout the 1980s, they 
challenged managers who ran large U.S. companies and pushed for the notion that the only 
legitimate goal of firms is shareholder-value maximization. By the 1990s, the shareholder-value 
paradigm was firmly in place. One clear indication is the prevalence of workforce downsizing. In 
the past, prominent U.S. companies had prided themselves on caring for their employees. Some 
(e.g., IBM) boasted of a no-layoff policy. Others in more cyclical industries (e.g., the Big Three 
automobile manufacturers) did use temporary layoffs during economic downturns but with the 
promise of recall. Shareholder primacy, however, leaves little room for such an implicit social 
contract between labor and business. Instead, leading U.S. companies now regularly downsize to 
maintain, restore, or boost stock price. 
In the present paper, I provide a theoretical account of this transformation of workforce 
downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy, building on two prominent theories in organizational 
sociology—resource dependence theory and Fligstein’s theory of conceptions of control, 
respectively. Building on resource dependence theory, I suggest that firms’ growing dependence 
on equity-financing makes them vulnerable to pressure from institutional investors, and that such 
pressures lead firms to downsize more frequently in their attempt to enhance stock performance. 
However I further suggest that their direct pressure may be limited to the extent that they are 49 
 
vulnerable to pressure from management and their ownership is dispersed. The results of my 
analysis largely support my argument. Although overall institutional ownership decreases the 
rate of downsizing announcements, that negative effect is mostly due to ownership by 
smallholding institutions, which tend to leave just before downsizing announcements. In contrast, 
ownership by blockholding institutions significantly increases the rate of downsizing 
announcements. Similarly, ownership by institutions that are unlikely to challenge management 
because of their current or potential business ties to firms (particularly banks) is negatively 
related to the rate of downsizing announcements, because they also tend to divest before 
downsizing announcements, whereas ownership by public pension funds, which are least 
vulnerable to pressure from management, significantly increases the rate of downsizing 
announcements.  
Second, further developing Fligstein’s theory of conceptions of control, I suggest that the 
rise of the shareholder-value paradigm of the firm has reshaped the behavior of managers with 
respect to downsizing, by constructing a decision context in which firms and their executives are 
induced to jump on the downsizing bandwagon. For most of the twentieth century, managers had 
little incentive to pursue shareholder-value maximization. The diffusion of various agency-
theory prescriptions has created a decision context in which managers view the maximization of 
shareholders’ wealth as in their own interest. Thanks to executive stock option grants and other 
equity-based compensation practices, executives have a greater stake in increasing share price. 
Monitoring by independent directors means that executives face an increased risk of losing their 
jobs if they fail to satisfy shareholders and fund managers. The rise of CFOs as second-in-
command to the CEO further infuses the shareholder-value orientation into the top management 
team. My results suggest that these agency-theory prescriptions presage the rise in downsizing by 50 
 
altering the context of managerial decision-making; managers have actively engaged in 
workforce downsizing more frequently, as they aim at maximum possible returns to their 
shareholders.  
My research makes a strong case for the financialization of the American corporation and 
the ascendance of shareholder power, by demonstrating the influence of institutional investors 
and shareholder-value-oriented managers over leading U.S. firms’ decision to downsize. 
Recently, a number of prominent scholars of industrial relations as well as sociologists have 
maintained that the growing pressure from financial markets and the rise of shareholder value 
have brought drastic changes to the employment policies of leading U.S. companies (Budros 
1997; 2002; Cappelli 1999; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Hirsch and De Soucey 2006; Osterman 
1999). With a corresponding power shift within corporations to executives responsible for 
finance, U.S. firms have placed a low priority on human resources relative to financial and 
shareholder considerations (Kochan forthcoming). As a result, firms downsize more readily than 
before, in order to raise the price of their stock immediately, even though it remains uncertain 
whether this strategy will improve their long-term viability. Although plausible, much more 
research is needed to specify how pressure from financial markets has induced firms to downsize. 
For instance, few studies directly examine the influence of institutional investors in the process, 
although many have suspected that they have played a crucial role (Batt and Appelbaum 2010; 
Useem 1996). My empirical findings demonstrate that the direct pressure from certain types of 
institutional investors has indeed resulted in more downsizing. My findings also demonstrate that 
the changed decision context, through the adoption of agency-theory prescriptions, has further 
contributed to the prevalence of downsizing, by promoting managers’ acceptance of downsizing 
as an effective strategy to enhance shareholder value.   51 
 
Beyond the contribution to the literature on workforce downsizing, the present research 
has broader theoretical implications for the literature of organizational sociology. My findings 
about the role of institutional investors highlight the importance of agency and power in 
institutional change, which, as criticized by many, previous studies by institutionalists have often 
neglected (DiMaggio 1988; Mizruchi and Fein 1999; Perrow 1986). Of particular importance in 
this respect is to elaborate the role of external power groups in institutional change. Recent 
efforts at synthesizing institutional and power theories emphasize that many historical examples 
of institutional change reflect the interest of powerful external groups (Dobbin and Dowd 2000; 
Roy 1997). This insight is particularly relevant in understanding the behavior of large 
corporations under the “new financial capitalism” (Davis 2009). Previously, professional 
managers literally monopolized the authority to determine key strategic decisions (Berle and 
Means 1933), but this kind of managerialism has recently been challenged. Since the 1980s, 
power groups in financial markets have exerted significant influence over important corporate 
decisions whose implications extend beyond the corporate and financial sectors (Davis et al. 
1994; Dobbin and Zorn 2005; Useem 1996). This research demonstrates the role of one such 
group, institutional investors, in reshaping employment policies of leading U.S., through their 
promotion of workforce downsizing.  
But my findings about decision context also point to the social construction of change agents. In 
the case at hand, agency theory and external groups in financial markets promoting its 
prescriptions have succeeded in reconstructing the interest of corporate managers, bringing the 
interest of shareholders and share value back to the fore and suppressing interests of other 
stakeholders such as employees. The significant positive effects of the various shareholder-value 
prescriptions deserve some attention. Other studies have cast doubt on the effectiveness of these 52 
 
prescriptions in reducing agency costs and enhancing corporate performance. For instance, a 
number of studies of equity-based executive compensation practices have failed to find that they 
improve performance (Dalton et al. 2003). Studies of board independence have come to a similar 
conclusion (Bhagat and Black 1999). Both of these shareholder-value prescriptions, however, 
induce downsizing. Although managers initially resisted shareholder primacy, in the changed 
decision context resulting from corporate embrace of various agency theory prescriptions, they 
have become agents of shareholder value and have actively engaged in downsizing. 
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3  LABOR RESISTANCE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CHANGING LAYOFF 
POLICIES 
 
Waves of downsizing have swept through corporate America since the 1980s, eroding whatever 
sense there had been of economic security for middle and working class Americans. This change 
reflects a fundamentally new conceptualization of employment relations on the part of employers 
and marks a radical departure from what Paul Osterman (1999) terms the “postwar institutional 
structure” of the labor market, in which employees of large American companies in primary 
business sectors have enjoyed a fairly high degree of job security and career stability. Not only 
did downsizing become more prevalent during this period, but its basic nature also changed. 
Previously, firms used to lay off employees in response to market demands but now cut jobs, 
often on a massive scale, even when times are good in order to boost financial performance. 
Moreover, whereas layoff previously meant temporary suspension of employment with an 
explicit or implicit agreement that laid-off employees would be called back when economic 
conditions improved, it now usually means permanent termination (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; 
Cappelli 1999; Osterman 1999).  
Behind this transformation of layoff policies are changing inter-class power dynamics in 
the corporate governance of large U.S. firms. Broadly defined, corporate governance refers to 
mechanisms of allocating power and wealth to key stakeholders, most importantly managers, 
shareholders, and workers (Davis 2005; Roe 2003). Previous sociological studies suggest that 
the changed power relations between managers and shareholders led to the rise of permanent 
layoff as a strategy of maximizing shareholder value (Budros 1997; 2002; Fligstein and Shin 
2007; Hirsch and De Soucey 2006; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000). These studies, however, do 
not provide a full picture of the changing inter-class power dynamics in the process. While 54 
 
focusing on the power relations between managers and shareholders, they largely overlook the 
resistance from workers and labor unions. Why did once-influential unions fail to prevent both 
the decline of temporary layoff and the rise of permanent layoff? This still requires explanation.  
To address this issue, I attend to the role of public policy. I argue that the policy regime 
in the 1980s affected the balance of power between business and labor and thereby facilitated 
the shift from temporary to permanent layoff. I build on the institutional literature on public 
policy and institutional change (Campbell and Lindberg 1990; Dobbin and Dowd 1997; 2000; 
Fligstein 1990; 1996; Marquis and Huang 2009; Roy 1997) and extend the literature in two main 
ways. First, I explore the role of public policy in shaping the power of groups to resist 
institutional change. My analysis demonstrates that labor unions, despite their declining political 
influence, attempted not only to maintain temporary layoff with a promise of recall but also to 
discourage permanent layoff to boost profits; but the policy regime of the 1980s significantly 
undermined the power of unions to do both. Second, I explore the role of policy in shaping 
legitimation processes; in this case, the perceived legitimacy of permanent and temporary layoff. 
My analysis shows how the anti-union, pro-business stance of the Reagan Administration, by 
undermining industrial unionism that supported temporary layoff, accelerated its 
deinstitutionalization while strengthening the legitimacy of permanent layoff. As a result, labor 
unions lost a critical battle in the 1980s and, although they regained some of their influence 
afterwards, did not fully recover from the loss. 
 
3.1  PUBLIC POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
There has been a long-standing interest among organizational sociologists, particularly those 
with a neoinstitutional perspective, in the role of public policy in institutional stability and 55 
 
change. In their seminal paper on institutionalization, Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 347-8) posit 
that, as the centralized state expands its dominance over diverse domains of social life, 
organizations adopt practices institutionalized by the state. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150) 
also list government mandates as one source of coercive isomorphism, one of the three 
mechanisms of institutional diffusion (see also Tolbert and Zucker 1983).  
Subsequent studies build on these initial insights and present a sophisticated account of 
the role of public policy in institutional change. In particular, a body of studies on modern 
personnel practices in the United States suggests that public policy plays a more subtle role than 
simply dictating specific actions (Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 1986; Dobbin and Sutton 1998; 
Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman 1990; 1992; Sutton and Dobbin 1996; Sutton et al. 1994). New 
policies often outlaw preexisting practices without providing clear mandates, leaving 
organizations themselves to formulate proper responses. Hence, the effect of public policy is not 
only direct but also indirect, a matter of constituting a new institutional environment to which 
organizations adapt. 
Organizational sociologists who study the behavior of firms build on these further 
insights and explore how public policy shapes business strategies. Here again, its role is an 
indirect one through the manipulation of the institutional environment in which important 
corporate decisions are made. The modern state establishes and enforces rules for economic 
exchanges, which in turn determine the “institutional basis of power relations” among key 
economic actors (Campbell and Lindberg 1990, p. 642). By affecting the distribution of 
economic resources and power among key stakeholders of firms, such rules crucially defines 
“who has claims on the profits of firm” (Fligstein 1996, p. 658). Therefore, major shifts in public 
policy reshape the power relations among key stakeholders and affect their ability to promote 56 
 
and enforce their preferred business strategies, often leading to significant changes in dominant 
business strategies (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994; Davis and Thompson 1994; Dobbin and 
Dowd 1997; 2000; Fligstein 1990; Roy 1997; Stearns and Allan 1996). 
Previous studies have demonstrated this indirect effect of public policy, through its 
impact on power dynamics among key stakeholders, on business strategies. For example, 
Fligstein (1985; 1987; 1990) shows that when the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 banned 
horizontal mergers (i.e., mergers between firms in the same industry), it stimulated intra-firm 
power struggles among managerial groups who promoted different solutions; ultimately, finance 
managers prevailed in their push for conglomerate mergers. The Reagan-era antitrust policy, 
however, again permitted horizontal mergers and provoked another round of power struggles, 
this time, between executives of conglomerate firms and corporate raiders targeting such firms 
(Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994; Stearns and Allan 1996). In response to the threat of 
hostile takeovers, large U.S. firms pursued the strategy of focusing on their core businesses and 
within-industry mergers, rather than conglomerate mergers and diversification.  
In another example, Dobbin and Dowd (2000) demonstrate that the shift in government’s 
antitrust policy in the late 19th century intensified inter-industry power struggles between 
railroad firms and financiers, who pushed for different models of managing competition. When 
antitrust laws banned cartels, large railroads moved to adopt predatory tactics of destroying 
competitors through a rate war. But financiers, with stock in many firms that might become prey, 
opposed predation, by threatening to cut capital flows to predators, and instead championed 
amicable mergers.  
In this paper, I attempt to advance the literature on how public policy shapes business 
models in two main ways. First, I explore how public policy affects the ability of actors and 57 
 
groups to resist, as well as to promote, institutional change. Although many previous studies 
posit that policy shifts lead to institutional change by redefining power relations among interest 
groups, they rarely examine how a new policy actually affects the power of competing groups to 
promote or resist change. Instead, they mostly rely on proxy measures of intra- or inter-
organizational power struggle.
4 More important, even studies that examine power struggle more 
directly tend to focus on how a new policy empowers groups who promote institutional change 
but rarely examine how the policy undermines the power of groups who may resist the change. 
As the literature on social movements suggests, mobilization of change agents often arouses 
counter-mobilization of groups who thrived under the status quo (Ingram and Rao 2004; Meyer 
and Staggenborg 1996; Vogus and Davis 2005). If the latter groups are powerful enough, drastic 
institutional change is unlikely (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005). In such cases, a new policy may 
also contribute to institutional change by limiting the ability of such groups to resist it.  
The second way in which I hope to advance the literature is by examining how policy 
shifts affect both the institutionalization and the deinstitutionalization of practices that are 
promoted by competing groups. Scott (1995) identifies three sources of institutionalization—
regulative, normative, and cognitive-cultural. Obviously, public policy is an important source of 
regulative legitimacy.  On the one hand, endorsement by the government legitimizes a given 
organizational practice (Baum and Oliver 1991; 1992; Ruef and Scott 1998; Russo 2001). On the 
other hand, competition or incongruence with the existing public-policy regime delegitimizes a 
given organizational form (Ingram and Simons 2000; Simons and Ingram 2003). In addition to 
this obvious effect of public policy, however, I suggest that a new policy can reinforce or 
undermine the other sources of institutionalization. Both organizational ecologists and 
                                                 
4 For instance, Fligstein (1990) suggests that in each historical period a different managerial group prevailed and 
runs separate models for each period. This way, his analysis captures the effect of shifts in power but cannot show 
how the shifts occurred. 58 
 
institutionalists have argued that increases in the density of a given organizational form or 
practice increases its cognitive-cultural legitimacy and thereby facilitates its diffusion across 
organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1989). I suggest that this 
density-dependent legitimation process may itself be dependent on public policy regimes. When 
a new policy prioritizes the claims of one group over those of others, the prevalence of a practice 
championed by the privileged group will further legitimize the practice, while dampening a 
similar density-dependent legitimation process for practices backed by other groups. In doing so, 
policy shifts can accelerate both the institutionalization of practices promoted by newly 
empowered groups and the deinstitutionalization of practices supported by groups negatively 
affected by policy shifts. In the following, I will argue that these two public-policy-driven 
mechanisms of institutionalization were at work in the transformation of layoff policies of many 
large U.S. companies.  
 
3.2  THE TRANSITION FROM TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT LAYOFF 
During the 1980s and 1990s, postwar labor-market institutions went through a tremendous 
change (Osterman 1999), prominent indications of which were the prevalence of layoffs and a 
shift in their nature from temporary suspension of employment to permanent termination. 
Underlying this shift was the decline of industrial unionism, which was championed by labor 
unions, and the rise of the shareholder-value model of the firm, which was promoted by new 
power groups in the financial market. Under industrial unionism, unions and employers had set 
the rules governing various aspects of employment relations, including wages, benefits, working 
hours, job descriptions, and terms of layoff (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994). Under the 59 
 
shareholder-value model, employers dismantled those rules and revised their employment 
practices in the interests of maximizing stock price.  
 
3.2.1  Industrial Unionism and Temporary Layoff 
The U.S. labor market is often said to be more market-oriented than its Western European and 
Japanese counterparts (Dore 1973; Hall and Soskice 2001; Swenson 2002). While this is 
generally the case, there still were considerable variation throughout American history in the 
extent to which market principles govern employment relations (Kochan et al. 1994). During the 
New Deal years, firms and unions, assisted by government intervention, developed a set of rules 
and norms by which they attempted to mitigate the harms to workers caused by excessive market 
competition (Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 1986; Jacoby 1985). Paul Osterman (1999, p. 21) 
argues that these rules and norms induced firms to ensure employees a high degree of job 
security in return for reciprocal commitment from employees to stay with the firm and invest in 
firm-specific skills.  
Labor unions, especially those in key industries such as automobile and steel, played a 
crucial part in establishing the postwar institutional structure. Many prominent elements of the 
system—e.g., seniority-based wage increases and closed and relatively stable internal career 
structures—emerged through bargains between major industrial unions and leading firms within 
the given industry. In particular, the agreement negotiated between General Motors and United 
Auto Workers (UAW) in 1948 became the model that was followed in other industries (Katz 
1985). The resulting model of employment relations also significantly shaped employment 
practices in non-unionized sectors (Kochan et al. 1994). To deflect demand for unionization, 
employers paid wages and benefits that came close to union advances and adopted many of the 60 
 
internal career structures prevalent within unionized firms (Leicht 1989). Some non-union 
employers went even further; the no-layoff policies of IBM and of Digital Equipment are well-
known examples.  
Temporary layoff followed by recall was one of the key elements of industrial unionism. 
Through this practice, firms could adjust the level of their workforce in response to declines in 
aggregate demand, while workers remained attached to their original employer. According to one 
estimate, at least 75 percent of the workers laid off in the manufacturing sector were 
subsequently rehired by their original employer during the 1970s (Feldstein 1976, p. 940). By the 
mid-1970s, temporary layoffs were so widespread that Martin Feldstein, a Harvard economics 
professor who served as chief economic advisor to President Ronald Reagan, proclaimed that 
“the overwhelming importance of temporary layoffs requires a revision of the basic conceptual 
framework within which layoffs and unemployment are now discussed” (Feldstein 1976, p. 955).  
While it was still management who decided when to make layoffs, unions had 
considerable control over the process. Collective bargaining agreements often included rules 
about who would get laid off and how their work would be re-allocated. Unions generally 
preferred temporary layoff to alternative forms of workforce adjustment (e.g., reduced hours) for 
two main reasons (Freeman and Medoff 1984, p. 115-16). First, the burden of layoff fell more on 
junior workers, who had less influence in union decisions, than on senior workers, who were 
protected by seniority rules and thus often active union members. Second, the unemployment 
insurance system tended to reward layoff-intensive adjustment practices, because the employer’s 
unemployment tax rate was capped; above a certain layoff rate, further layoff did not increase the 
employer’s tax rate. In the 1960s and the 1970s, studies by labor economists show, firms in 
highly unionized sectors were more likely than those in non-unionized sectors to respond to 61 
 
declines in aggregate demand by temporarily laying off workers (Freeman and Medoff 1984; 
Medoff 1979; Montgomery 1991).  
 
3.2.2  Shareholder Value and Permanent Layoff 
The industrial unionism that guided employment practices in many large U.S. corporations began 
to collapse in the 1980s (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Cappelli 1999; Kochan et al. 1994; 
Osterman 1999). Foreign competition and deep recessions in the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
intensified firms’ search for alternative models of workplace governance that would contain 
costs and enhance competitiveness (Barley and Gideon 1992). The anti-union, pro-business 
stance of the Reagan Administration and the steady decline of labor unions helped precipitate the 
demise of industrial unionism (Clawson and Clawson 1999). 
Another significant cause of the collapse came from the financial sector—the rise of 
shareholder value. Osterman (1999, p. 30-31) suggests that the postwar institutional structure 
was possible partly because of the weak influence of shareholders during the postwar period.  
Formally, American corporate law gave shareholders primacy in the governance of the firm. In 
reality, however, as Berle and Means noted as early as 1933, professional managers, because of 
dispersed ownership, enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. Their relative autonomy allowed 
managers to make concessions to labor unions in workplace issues. To be sure, they did not so 
purely out of some kind of social consciousness. In fact, U.S. managers remained hostile to the 
industrial union model (Kochan et al. 1994). Resistance toward unions had been historically 
embedded in their belief system of U.S. managers (Bendix 1956). But while such anti-union 
sentiment persisted among managers, they nonetheless came to see unions as inevitable, and they 62 
 
pragmatically accommodated to collective bargaining in order to avoid the high costs of 
dislodging established unions (Kochan et al. 1994, p. 14).  
This corporate governance system, characterized by “strong managers and weak owners” 
(Roe 1994) has gone through a significant change since the 1980s. Hostile takeovers in the 1980s 
and the growth of institutional ownership undermined the norm of managerial control (Davis et 
al. 1994; Davis and Thompson 1994; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Useem 1996). Assertive 
shareholders sought to regain control over key governance issues, such as the choice of chief 
executives and directors (Khurana 2002; Useem 1996). These new developments sent a strong 
message that firms must maximize shareholder value in order not to be victimized by the flux of 
the financial market (Dobbin and Zorn 2005; Fligstein and Markowitz 1993; Zajac and Westphal 
2004). As managers sought to enhance profitability and thus stock price, less room was left for 
making concessions to labor unions. Instead, managers became more aggressive in demanding 
concessions from unions and cutting labor costs. Prior research suggests that the shareholder-
value orientation is closely related to the prevalence of massive layoff and the change in its 
nature (Budros 1997; 2002; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000). While most 
layoffs in the past were temporary and often followed by recall, recent ones are more or less 
equivalent to permanent termination (Cappelli 1999; Osterman 1999).  
 
3.3  THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE SHIFT OF LAYOFF POLICIES 
What role did public policy play in the shift of layoff policies? Of course, no policy specified 
which form of layoff firms should rely on when they had to adjust their workforce. But building 
on my discussion above regarding the role public policy in institutional change, I suggest that the 
policy stance of the government in the 1980s facilitated the shift, by weakening both the power 63 
 
of unions to resist the shift to permanent layoff and the cultural-cognitive legitimacy of 
temporary layoff. Labor unions tried to discourage permanent layoff and, when some kind of 
workforce adjustment was unavoidable, turned to temporary layoff, but their ability to do both 
was severely constrained by the anti-union, pro-business stance of the Reagan Administration. At 
the same time, many of the harsh actions taken by the same administration towards unions 
undermined the industrial unionism on which the cognitive-cultural legitimacy of temporary 
layoff was critically dependent, thereby facilitating the deinstitutionalization of temporary layoff 
as well as the institutionalization of permanent layoff. I first sketch hypotheses about the role of 
union resistance and cognitive-cultural legitimacy of both temporary and permanent layoff in the 
shift to the latter form of layoff. And then I discuss how the hypothesized effects of these two 
factors are contingent on the policy stance of the government.  
 
3.3.1  Resistance from Labor Unions 
Obviously, labor unions actively resisted the shift in the dominant model of employment 
relations. I suggest that union resistance came in two forms. First, they strove to sustain their 
preferred method of workforce adjustment—temporary layoff. While there is considerable 
evidence that they succeeded in the 1960s and 1970s, in that firms in highly unionized sectors 
were more likely to make temporary layoffs (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Medoff 1979; 
Montgomery 1991), it remains unclear whether labor unions exerted similar influence in the 
significantly changed economic and political environments since the 1980s. There is some 
indication that labor unions were able to maintain the use of temporary layoff, at least within 
their strongholds. During the 1987 Ford-UAW contract negotiations, for example, the union 
accepted lower wage increases and less rigid work rules than under the prior contract, in return 64 
 
for landmark job-security protections for its members, which, nevertheless, permitted temporary 
layoffs in case production had to be cut back because of a drop in sales (Holusha 1987). Given 
this strong preference of unions for temporary layoff, I expect that the use of temporary layoff is 
more likely within highly unionized sectors.  
Hypothesis 1-1: Union density at the industry level is positively associated with the rate of 
temporary layoff.    
At the same time, labor unions resisted the alternative form of workforce reduction—
permanent layoff. Although the steady decline of union membership and union strike activities 
throughout the 1980s should have limited their ability to prevent permanent layoffs, unions did 
fight back fiercely. For instance, after AT&T’s announcement of 24,000 job cuts in August of 
1985, the Communications Workers of America warned that the cutbacks could create 
“insurmountable obstacles” for AT&T in negotiating a new contract with the union (Stevenson 
1985). When this kind of warning was not well heeded by management, unions could resort to a 
more disruptive tactics, mostly importantly calling for a strike. Although such tactics might not 
prevent permanent layoff indefinitely, they might still discourage firms from considering it for 
the time being.  
Hypothesis 1-2: Union strike activities will decrease the rate of permanent layoff.  
 
3.3.2  Cognitive-Cultural Legitimacy of Temporary versus Permanent Layoff 
Another factor that could affect the shift of layoff policies was the cognitive-cultural legitimacy 
of temporary layoff versus that of permanent layoff. Both institutionalists and organizational 
ecologists posit that organizations take the density of a given practice as an indicator of its 
cultural-cognitive legitimacy within the field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hannan and Freeman 65 
 
1989). Studies have shown that as more organizations adopt the practice, it further induces other 
organizations to follow suit (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Hannan et al. 1995; Haveman 1993; 
Haveman and Rao 1997; Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert 2005; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). A similar 
pattern is observed in the case of permanent layoff. It was rare among prominent U.S. 
companies until the 1980s but soon became “business-as-usual” as more firms downsized 
(Budros 1999). While this growing prevalence of permanent layoff should help institutionalize 
this type of layoff, this might not immediately result in the deinstitutionalization of temporary 
layoff. In sectors with strong union presence, such as the automobile industry, a considerable 
number of firms continued to rely on temporary layoff as a means to adjust workforce 
throughout the 1980s. Although the number of such firms declined steadily, their continued use 
of temporary layoff should induce other firms in the same sector at least to consider relying on it 
rather than turning to permanent layoff. Hence: 
Hypothesis2-1: The density of temporary layoffs will increase the rate of temporary layoff, and 
the density of permanent layoff will increase the rate of permanent layoff.  
At the same time, the density of one type of layoff may discourage firms from turning to 
the other type. Studies on inter-form competition show that the prevalence of one organizational 
form or practice can undermine the cognitive-cultural legitimacy of an alternative one (Barnett 
and Woywode 2004; Ruef 2000; 2004). As more organizations abandon a given practice and 
adopt an alternative practice, others will jump ship (Greve 1995). Hence, in the case of 
temporary layoff, firms are more likely to turn away from it when many firms in the same sector 
turn increasingly to permanent layoff. In this case, inter-form competition contributes to 
institutional change by facilitating the deinstitutionalization of a previously prevalent practice. 
In contrast, firms are less willing to rely on permanent layoff and stick to temporary layoff when 66 
 
most firms in the same sector do. In this case, inter-form competition delays institutional change 
by slowing down the institutionalization of a new practice.  
Hypothesis2-2: The density of temporary layoffs will decrease the rate of permanent layoff, and 
the density of permanent layoff will decrease the rate of temporary layoff.  
 
3.3.3   The Role of Public Policy 
My third and most important set of hypotheses concerns how public policy affects the power of 
labor unions and the density-dependent process of legitimation. Previous studies suggest that a 
significant shift in public policy can change the balance of power among interest groups within 
and around the firm, and thereby affect the institutional standing of the practices promoted by 
each group (Davis et al. 1994; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Fligstein 1990; Roy 1997; Stearns and 
Allan 1996). I focus here on the policy regime in the 1980s, a time of many significant policy 
changes regarding the role of unions.   
Particularly relevant to the present study is the anti-union stance of the Reagan 
Administration. Deeply influenced by free market ideology, Reagan officials were wary of 
measures that would restrict management’s flexibility, including the ability to fire employees. 
This stance significantly undermined the ability of labor unions to challenge management. 
Government policies, of course, had always affected labor unions’ ability to challenge 
management, but their influence intensified and became more adverse under the Reagan 
Administration. Early in industrialization, the government mostly attempted to repress strike 
activities, but, after the New Deal, it turned to the more preventive approach of encouraging 
collective bargaining between management and organized labor and thus significantly enhanced 
unions’ bargaining power vis-à-vis management throughout the postwar period (Kaufman 1982; 67 
 
McCammon 1993; Snyder 1975). The Reagan Administration, however, turned the tables again 
and took a more repressive approach, as was seen in its unrelenting response to the air traffic 
controllers’ strike in 1981 that resulted in the firing of 11,000 striking air traffic controllers. As a 
result of this change in the political environment, the effect of strike activities on the economic 
standing of workers has been significantly reduced since the 1980s (Rosenfeld 2006; Wallace, 
Leicht, and Raffalovich 1999).  
The Reagan Administration’s anti-union stance also severely undermined the ability of 
labor unions to organize workers. Emboldened by the Administration’s pro-business stance, 
management adopted aggressive union-defying tactics such as illegal discharges and other 
employment reprisals against union activities (Cooke and Meyer 1990; Goldfield 1987; Meyer 
and Cooke 1993). In many cases, however, decisions and rulings by courts, National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), and other federal and state agencies were made in favor of 
management (Goldfield 1987). As a consequence of various union-defying tactics and favorable 
court and administrative rulings, the frequency of union certification elections and the 
percentage of union victories fell sharply (Farber and Western 2002; Tope and Jacobs 2009). 
Particularly vulnerable to this changed political environment were unions in key manufacturing 
sectors, such as automobile and steel, that were accustomed to business-labor cooperation under 
industrial unionism (Martin and Dixon 2010).  
I expect that the actions taken by the Reagan Administration to weaken the power of 
labor unions both to maintain temporary layoffs and to prevent permanent layoffs. Particularly 
relevant to the case of layoff policies is the struggle over the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act (WARN), which required employers to notify employees at least 60 days in 
advance of permanent layoffs or plant closings. The legislation was originally a provision of a 68 
 
comprehensive trade bill as a concession made to unions for their support for the bill. When the 
bill passed both the Congress and the Senate in 1988, however, President Reagan vetoed the 
entire bill because of the plant-closing provision. The provision passed as a separate law later the 
same year and avoided the President’s veto, but only after the requirement of 60 days’ notice 
was significantly watered down.
5 By first vetoing and then watering down WARN, the 
Administration successfully defeated unions’ attempt to gain some nominal control over layoff 
policies. This kind of incident suggests that the 1980s under the Reagan Administration (and to a 
lesser degree under the Bush Administration) was a particularly hostile political environment for 
unions. Although the stance of subsequent administrations was hardly pro-labor, the Reagan 
Administration’s stance was by far most anti-union.  
Hypothesis 3-1: The positive effect of union density on the rate of temporary layoff will be less 
in the 1980s than in the later period. 
Hypothesis 3-2: The negative effect of union strike activity on the rate of permanent layoff will 
be less in the 1980s than in the later period. 
I further expect the anti-union stance of the Reagan Administration to impair the 
cognitive-cultural legitimacy of temporary layoff, which was supported by unions, while 
strengthening that of permanent layoff, which was preferred by managers. Although the 
government did not openly advocate permanent layoff over temporary layoff, it did so indirectly. 
Elected with a promise to reduce the size of government, the Reagan Administration vehemently 
pursued public sector downsizing. According to one estimate, during the first three years of the 
Reagan administration, more than 12,000 of 1.4 million white-collar civil servants were fired 
                                                 
5 The revised bill affected only companies that employ at least 100 full-time workers at one site and required notice 
only if 500 workers or one-third of a plant's work force, whichever was lower, were affected by a layoff order. A 
company was also exempt from the requirement if the closing or layoff was caused by “not reasonably foreseeable 
circumstances” like a flood or drought. Finally, the requirement also did not apply if sending out a notice would 
harm the company's ability to raise capital or attract new business or if the company’s workers were on strike. 69 
 
(Causey 1985). The recurring rhetoric of a smaller and more efficient government resonated 
perfectly with the popular business rhetoric of “lean and mean” firms, which was frequently 
heard when firms justified their layoff and plant-closing decisions (Budros 2002). I expect this 
political environment privileging firms’ right to dismiss workers to alter the density-dependent 
process of legitimation between temporary and permanent layoff, in favor of the latter. Hence, 
the positive density effect on the rate of the same type of layoff will become weaker in the case 
of temporary layoff but stronger in the case of permanent layoff. At the same time, the negative  
density effect on the rate of the other type of layoff will be weaker in the case of temporary 
layoff but stronger in the case of permanent layoff. Hence:  
Hypothesis 3-3: The positive effect of temporary-layoff density on the rate of temporary layoff 
will be less in the 1980s than in the later period, while the positive effect of permanent-
layoff density on the rate of permanent layoff will be greater in the 1980s than in the 
later period.  
Hypothesis 3-4: The negative effect of temporary-layoff density on the rate of permanent layoff 
will be less in the 1980s than in the later period, while the negative effect of permanent-
layoff density on the rate of temporary layoff will be greater in the 1980s than in the later 
period.  
 
3.4  DATA AND METHOD 
I present event-history models of temporary versus permanent layoff announcements, which runs 
two separate event history models for each form of layoff. This method is suited to testing 
whether the power of labor unions and density dynamics work differently for the two types of 
layoff. The analysis covers the period from 1984 to 2006. Due to data issues—most labor-union-70 
 
related variables are available from only 1984 on—the analysis does not cover the first term of 
the Reagan Administration, but even with this limitation, my models capture significant effects 
of policy shifts during the period. 
 
3.4.1  Sample  
The original sample included 789 large U.S. companies that were traded between 1965 and 2006. 
The primary sampling frame is Fortune’s list of America’s largest firms. I and my collaborators 
in data collection stratified the sample by industry, selecting a roughly equal number of firms 
from 23 industries.
6 Most industries (16 out of 23) were sampled exclusively from the Fortune 
Industrial 500, and the remainder from specialized Fortune lists. For entertainment and health 
care, we used Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory for years before 1983, at which point 
Fortune began to cover these industries. Another important aspect of our sample is that, unlike 
most longitudinal studies of large firms that use samples drawn at the beginning, we sampled 
firms evenly across the entire observation period. This ensures that our sample is not biased 
toward successful firms in later years and includes firms in growing as well as declining 
industries. For the present study, I use data on 681 firms that were listed as companies between 
1984and 2006. It covers a period early enough to observe the transformation of layoff policies, 
because previous studies suggest that it happened after the early 1980s (Cappelli 1999; Kochan 
et al. 1994; Osterman 1999).   
 
3.4.2  Dependent Variable: Layoff Announcements 
I have collected information on the history of layoff announcements for the firms in my sample 
since 1980. The data are obtained through extensive archival search. The primary source is the 
                                                 
6 See Footnote 1.   71 
 
Lexis/Nexis electronic database. The database catalogues most major newspapers, such as The 
Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, and several newswire services. Rather than relying 
on one or two major newspapers—a tactic that most previous studies adopted—I use all possible 
sources, including local newspapers. Cases that referred to previously announced layoffs were 
dropped. Ultimately, 5,717 layoff announcements were identified. I classify them into 
announcements of temporary layoff and those of permanent layoffs. An announced layoff was 
regarded as temporary when the firm described it as such (often by implying that) and revealed 
its duration. Firms sometimes did not reveal the duration of announced layoffs but instead said 
that they would last for an “indefinite” period. While this kind of layoff are in between 
temporary and permanent ones, I still regard it as a temporary one, because, when announcing an 
indefinite layoff, firms typically implied that the laid off workers would be recalled later. Finally, 
involuntary furlough, a practice that is common in industries such as the airline industry, is also 
regarded as temporary layoff. In total, 496 announcements are classified as temporary layoff 
announcements. The rest are considered as permanent. 
 
3.4.3  Independent Variables 
I use two measures of the influence of labor unions. The first measure is union membership at 
the industry level. Although a firm-level measure would be preferable (there are few reliable 
sources of firm-level union membership), the industry-level measure should capture the 
influence of unions over employment practices of firms within a given sector, because, as most 
historical accounts suggest, powerful industrial unions helped establish standards of employment 
practices within their respective industry, which even non-unionized employers could not simply 
ignore (Katz 1985; Kochan et al. 1994). The data on annual, industry-level union membership 72 
 
are provided by Hirsch and Macpherson (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003), via their website 
(http://www.unionstats.com). Their estimates are based on the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) methods. Because many firms have operations in more 
than one industry, I calculate a weighted average of union membership at industries in which a 
firm has operations. The weight for an industry is the portion of the firm’s sales from that 
industry. This information is from Compustat’s segment database. The second measure of the 
influence of unions is the incidence of union strike activities. I construct an indicator variable of 
whether there was an incidence of work stoppage involving 1,000 or more workers at the firms 
in my sample over the 12-month period. The data on work stoppage are from the Federal 
Mediation Conciliation Service (FMCS) and the BLS. The density of temporary (permanent) 
layoffs is measured as the percentage of firms within the focal firm’s industry, not including the 
focal firm, that announced temporary (permanent) layoffs in the previous 12-month period. 
Finally, to capture the effect of the government’s anti-labor stance in the 1980s, I construct an 
indicator variable for the period. The effects of the policy regime on both the influence of labor 
unions and layoff density are captured by interaction terms of these variables with the period 
indicator.   
 
3.4.4  Control Variables 
I also control for a wide range of firm-level as well as industry- or economy-wise factors that 
have previously been shown to affect a firm’s decision to conduct a workforce reduction. 
Definitions and data sources for each variable are listed in Table 3.1. Some variables included in 
the analyses vary annually, and others vary quarterly. These control variables as well as the key 
explanatory variables are lagged so that they reflect the state in the previous fiscal year or quarter.  73 
 
First, I include measures of pressure from financial markets and of a given firm’s 
shareholder-value orientation. Previous studies suggest that these factors are positively related to 
the rate of permanent layoff (Budros 1997; 2002). For pressure from financial markets, I include 
hostile takeover bids for a given firm and ownership by blockholding institutional investors (the 
percentage of a firm’s stock owned by institutions holding 5 percent of more of its stock). For a 
firm’s shareholder-value orientation, I control for the percentage of outside (i.e., non-employee) 
directors on the board, who are more independent of management than inside directors, and the 
presence of a chief financial officer (CFO), who often leads a firm’s efforts at restructuring.  
In addition to those measures of a firm’s shareholder-value orientation, other firm-level and 
environment-level factors are included. To begin with firm-level factors, a given firm’s prior 
performance should be an important factor behind its decision for both temporary and permanent 
layoff. Return on assets (ROA) is a widely used measure of a firm’s operating performance, and 
cumulative stock returns (the change in share price over the previous three months) measures the 
firm’s stock performance. Another potentially important measure of performance is whether a 
firm meets the consensus (i.e., average) forecast of securities analysts covering the firm. I 
include a binary variable, coded as one if a firm’s reported quarterly earnings per share is less 
than the consensus forecast. A firm’s debt burden is measured by debt-to-equity ratio. To 
account for the possibility that workforce downsizing follows other restructuring moves, I 
include the number of acquisitions and divestitures completed by the focal firm in the previous 
fiscal quarter. The degree of diversification is measured using the entropy index of 
diversification (Jacquemin and Berry 1979; Palepu 1985). A firm’s workforce size is the total 
number of employees, both domestic and foreign. Investment in new technology is measured 
using a firm’s net expenditure in property, plant, and equipment (PPE) per employee. A firm’s 74 
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asset size is also controlled for. 
Several important aspects of macroeconomic or institutional contexts are also considered. 
First, quarter-to-quarter changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) tap overall macro economic 
conditions. Industry growth rate is measured as the percentage change in the aggregate sales for 
each 2-digit SIC industry the firm operates in. Aggregate sales were calculated using information 
for all companies in Compustat. An indicator variable for recessionary periods (1990-1991 and 
2000-2001) is included. An annual time-trend variable is included to capture the effect of 
unmeasured secular trends.  
 
3.4.5  Missing Values and Multiple Imputation  
For some explanatory and control variables, missing values are of concern. The most severe case 
is the ROA variable; for about 18 percent of all quarterly intervals, this information is not 
available. The amount of missing data is also reported in Table 3.1. When the data are missing 
for reasons that are not completely random, list-wise deletion tends to yield biased estimates 
(Allison 2002). To address this problem, I impute missing values using multiple imputation, 
using a R package called Amelia II (King et al. 2001). It predicts missing values from the 
complete data but adds to the predicted value a random error from a normal distribution. Hence, 
it generates N different data sets, each containing different imputed values for the missing 
component. For a moderate number of missing cases (e.g., 10 to 20 percent), 5 to 10 data sets are 
usually sufficient. 10 data sets were generated for the present study. The resulting coefficients 
and standard errors are combined using the formula in King et al. (2001, p. 53).  
 
3.4.6  Modeling Procedure 76 
 
I analyze layoff announcements between 1984 and 2006, using a continuous-time event history 
analysis. Announcement-spells are defined as the time intervals between announcements; hence, 
the duration time is reset to zero every time an event occurs. The metric for duration is day, 
which is fine-grained enough for continuous-time models. Since firms in the sample typically 
made more than one layoff announcement, the total number of announcement-spells exceeds the 
number of firms. I split each spell into quarterly intervals so that time-varying predictors are 
updated on a quarterly basis. Predictors are lagged to avoid the problem of rate dependence, that 
is, a time-varying predictor’s value at time t is affected by the subject’s hazard rate. Hence, for 
those variables that vary quarterly (annually), they reflect the state in the previous quarter (year).  
For many firms, their first spells are left-truncated. Left-truncation can be handled 
properly, as long as one knows the reference for the onset of the left-truncated spells—the date 
of the last layoff announcement in the current case. For each left-truncated spell, I searched 
beyond 1984 to identify the date of the previous announcement. However, this was done only up 
to January 1st, 1980; prior to this point, media coverage of layoff announcements available from 
Lexis/Nexis was very sparse and, even when available, not detailed enough to distinguish 
between temporary and permanent layoffs. Therefore, for those spells (448 for temporary layoff 
and 381 for permanent layoff), the beginning point was set to January 1st, 1980. I conducted a 
robustness check by estimating models without those spells, which is the most common method 
for handling the problem of left-truncation (Singer and Willett 2003). The results were 
qualitatively the same.  
I use a Cox regression model for estimation. The Cox model is a widely used method for 
continuous-time event history analysis, because it incorporates a flexible framework for studying 
the duration until each event; unlike other parametric models, it does not require researchers to 77 
 
choose some particular probability distribution to represent survival times (Allison 1995). 
Without having much prior knowledge, any choice of the functional form for the baseline hazard 
function would be arbitrary. Instead, the Cox regression model lets the data determine the shape 
of the hazard function (Allison 1995). Given the two alternative forms of layoff—temporary and 
permanent—I run separate event history models for each form of layoff (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004, p. 168-9). 
The repeatability of the event under study requires special treatment; there can be 
dependence among the multiple observations from the same unit, arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity (Allison 1995, p. 240). To address this issue, I use the fixed-effects Cox regression, 
which lets announcement-spells of the same firm share the same baseline hazard function. 
Allison (1996, p. 220) suggests that the fixed-effects estimator addresses repeatable events better 
than conventional single-event approaches and, by accounting for all unobserved subject-specific 
characteristics, enables one to make a more stringent causal argument. One shortfall of this 
model is that it is most feasible when most subjects under study experience an event more than 
once. This is the case with permanent layoffs but not for temporary layoffs. In fact, only 97 firms 
out the total sample of 681 made a temporary-layoff announcement at least once, while 582 firms 
made a permanent-layoff announcement. Hence, I conduct robustness checks using a random-
effects variant of Cox model, which, unlike the fixed-effect model, does not drop subjects that do 
not experience (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, p. 162-6). The results are mostly similar to 
those from the fixed-effects model.  
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My data of layoff announcements demonstrate significant changes in layoff policies of large U.S. 
corporations since the 1980s. Figure 2.1 plots average count of the number of layoffs announced 
by all sampled firms from 1980 to 2006. There are two noticeable trends. First, layoff 
announcements have become more frequent. Whereas, during the recession in the early 1980s, 
firms on average made about 0.4 layoff announcement (including both temporary and permanent 
layoffs), during the recession in the early 2000s, firms on average made more than one 
announcement. Second and more importantly, announced layoffs have been predominantly 
permanent ones. Early on, the ratio of temporary to permanent layoffs was close to one, but it has 
come down to 0.1 in the later period. The same pattern is observed, in a more dramatic way, in 
the transportation equipment industry, a stronghold of the UAW, probably the most influential 
industrial union in the U.S. (see Figure 2.2). There, temporary layoffs were more commonly seen 
than permanent ones in the early 1980s and persisted throughout the 1980s. But they declined 
rapidly afterwards.   
 
3.5.1  Union Resistance and Public Policy 
Table 3.2 presents the event-history models of temporary and permanent layoffs. The results 
generally support my hypotheses about how the policy regime in the 1980s affects the influence 
of labor unions and the effect of density-dependent legitimation process. To begin with the 
influence of unions, there is some evidence that it helped maintain temporary layoffs and 
discouraged permanent layoffs, but such effects were critically contingent on the public policy 
regime. In Model 1, neither union member nor union strike activity significantly affects the rate 
of temporary layoff. With an interaction term with the period indicator for the 1980s added in 
Model 2, union membership has a significant positive main effect. But its interaction has a    79 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Temporary and Permanent Layoff Announcements (All Sampled Firms) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Temporary and Permanent Layoff Announcements (Firms in the Transportation 
                   Equipment Industry) 
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significantly negative one, which suggests that the ability of unions to maintain temporary layoff 
was significantly undermined in the 1980s. After the 1980s, they regained some of their 
influence so that temporary layoff continued at least within union strongholds. Specifically, one 
percent increases in union membership increases the hazard rate by about 4.6 percent 
(100*[exp(0.045)-1]; p<0.05). A similar interaction pattern is not observed for union strike 
activity in the case of temporary layoff.  
The influence of labor unions also discouraged permanent layoffs, but, again, their 
influence was significantly contingent on the public policy regime. As is the case with 
temporary layoff, there is no significant main effect of union membership and union strike 
activity on the rate of permanent layoff. With an interaction term with the period indicator in 
Model 5, the main term for union strike activity becomes negative and statistically significant. 
Specifically, the rate of permanent layoff for firms that experienced a work stoppage in the 
previous year is about 22 percent (=100*[exp(-0.249)-1] ; p<0.05) less than that of firms that did 
not. But the interaction term has a significant, positive coefficient, which implies that union 
strike activity was not as effective in preventing permanent layoffs in the 1980s as it was in the 
later period. Note also that there is no similar negative effect of union membership on the rate of 
permanent layoff. It seems that it requires more direct confrontational tactics to block permanent 
layoffs, than the mere presence of unions.  
 
3.5.2  Density-Dependent Legitimation and Public Policy 
Turning to the density-dependent legitimation process, there is also strong evidence that public 
policy significantly affects its outcome. As expected, in Models 1 and 4, the density of each type 
of layoff increases the rate of the same type, respectively. Further analyses in Models 3 and 6, 81 
 
 
 
   
Union Membership 0.021 (0.016) 0.045* (0.018) 0.026 (0.016)
1980s × Union Membership -0.044*** (0.012)
Union Strike -0.225 (0.245) -0.450 (0.356) -0.119 (0.250)
1980s × Union Strike 0.319 (0.491)
Density of Temporary Layoffs 3.639*** (0.747) 3.485*** (0.751) 4.139*** (0.974)
1980s × Temporary Layoff Density -4.068** (1.503)
Density of Permanent Layoffs -0.237 (0.325) -0.352 (0.328) -0.237 (0.342)
1980s × Permanent Layoff Density 3.783*** (0.935)
Period 1980s 0.817*** (0.226) 2.462*** (0.508) -0.182 (0.364)
Ownership by Blockholding Instit. 2.870** (0.946) 2.964** (0.947) 3.090** (0.958)
Hotile Takeover Bid -0.410 (1.064) -0.452 (1.076) -0.207 (1.049)
Board Independence -0.906 (0.920) -0.102 (0.959) -0.887 (0.939)
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) -0.465* (0.192) -0.477* (0.198) -0.401* (0.197)
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.022 (0.028) -0.021 (0.029) -0.014 (0.029)
Cumulative Stock Returns -1.633*** (0.327) -1.610*** (0.329) -1.598*** (0.326)
Fail to Meet Analyst Forecasts 0.343** (0.119) 0.315** (0.120) 0.334** (0.120)
Sales Growth -0.005 (0.005) -0.005 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005)
Debt-to-Equity 0.181* (0.084) 0.145 (0.085) 0.171* (0.085)
Diversification -0.235 (0.365) -0.314 (0.366) -0.166 (0.362)
Acquisitions 0.678 (0.483) 0.660 (0.481) 0.688 (0.482)
Divestitures -0.155 (0.122) -0.158 (0.121) -0.193 (0.122)
Number of Employees 1.457*** (0.312) 1.524*** (0.318) 1.414*** (0.322)
Net Expenditure in PPE -0.199 (0.296) -0.309 (0.300) -0.080 (0.307)
Total Assets 0.026 (0.267) -0.049 (0.271) -0.176 (0.276)
Quarterly Change in CPI -0.401*** (0.103) -0.414*** (0.103) -0.427*** (0.105)
Recessionary Period 0.515*** (0.146) 0.460** (0.147) 0.468** (0.149)
Industry Growth Rate 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.00001 (0.003)
Annual Time-Trend 0.061* (0.029) 0.087** (0.030) 0.058 (0.030)
Log Likelihood
No. Quarterly Intervals
No. Announcement Events
No. Firms
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests)
97 97 97
420 420 420
7,055 7,055 7,055
-1,237.325 -1,229.146 -1,228.646
Table 3.2: Event-History Analysis of Temporary versus Permanent Layoff Announcements
Temporary Layoff
Model 1 Model 2 Model 382 
 
 
 
   
Union Membership 0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
1980s × Union Membership 0.002 (0.004)
Union Strike -0.098 (0.086) -0.249* (0.101) -0.099 (0.086)
1980s × Union Strike 0.583** (0.187)
Density of Temporary Layoffs 1.467*** (0.233) 1.409*** (0.234) 1.196*** (0.257)
1980s × Temporary Layoff Density -1.150* (0.533)
Density of Permanent Layoffs 0.610*** (0.088) 0.625*** (0.088) 0.674*** (0.090)
1980s × Permanent Layoff Density 2.130*** (0.424)
Period 1980s -0.856*** (0.067) -0.950*** (0.114) -1.382*** (0.115)
Ownership by Blockholding Instit. 0.793** (0.250) 0.788** (0.250) 0.801** (0.250)
Hotile Takeover Bid 0.894** (0.284) 0.902** (0.285) 0.915** (0.285)
Board Independence 0.810** (0.250) 0.807** (0.251) 0.831*** (0.252)
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 0.257*** (0.053) 0.262*** (0.053) 0.255*** (0.053)
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.064*** (0.007) -0.064*** (0.007) -0.064*** (0.007)
Cumulative Stock Returns -0.752*** (0.086) -0.750*** (0.086) -0.735*** (0.086)
Fail to Meet Analyst Forecasts 0.291*** (0.033) 0.291*** (0.033) 0.289*** (0.033)
Sales Growth -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Debt-to-Equity 0.086*** (0.022) 0.086*** (0.022) 0.088*** (0.022)
Diversification -0.170* (0.075) -0.153* (0.076) -0.147 (0.076)
Acquisitions 0.581*** (0.086) 0.583*** (0.086) 0.585*** (0.086)
Divestitures 0.049* (0.022) 0.049* (0.022) 0.048* (0.022)
Number of Employees 1.694*** (0.099) 1.694*** (0.099) 1.670*** (0.098)
Net Expenditure in PPE 0.513*** (0.075) 0.520*** (0.075) 0.503*** (0.074)
Total Assets -0.304*** (0.080) -0.307*** (0.080) -0.291*** (0.080)
Quarterly Change in CPI -0.125*** (0.026) -0.125*** (0.026) -0.130*** (0.026)
Recessionary Period 0.429*** (0.038) 0.433*** (0.038) 0.423*** (0.038)
Industry Growth Rate -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001)
Annual Time-Trend 0.035*** (0.007) 0.034*** (0.007) 0.030*** (0.007)
Log Likelihood
No. Quarterly Intervals
No. Announcement Events
No. Firms
38,397 38,397 38,397
-15,616.088 -15,629.107 -15,634.277
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests)
528 528 528
4,988 4,988 4,988
Table 3.2 (Continued)
Permanent Layoff
Model 4 Model 5 Model 683 
 
however, demonstrate that the policy regime in the 1980s significantly altered the positive effect 
of form-specific density measures. On the one hand, in Model 4, the positive effect of 
temporary-layoff density on the rate of the same type of layoff is significantly reduced in the 
1980s. Combined with the interaction term with the period indicator for the 1980s, its coefficient 
becomes close to zero (0.071=4.139-4.068), meaning that its significantly positive effect is 
limited only to the period after the 1980s. It seems that the anti-union stance of the government 
in the 1980s negatively affected the cognitive-cultural legitimacy of temporary layoff, which 
was preferred by labor unions; as a result, firms stopped considering it serious even when some 
other firms in the same industry continued the practice. On the other hand, in Model 6, the 
positive effect of permanent-layoff density on the rate of the same type of layoff is significantly 
reinforced. The combined coefficient for the 1980s (i.e., 2.804=0.674+2.130) is significantly 
larger than the main effect for the period after the 1980s (i.e., 0.674). This pattern suggests that 
the strong pro-business stance of the government in the 1980s strengthened management’s 
ability to make permanent adjustment to workforce size, whenever they saw it necessary.  
Contrary to my predictions, however, there is little evidence that the density of one type 
of layoff decreases the rate of the other type. In Model 1, the density of permanent layoff does 
not decrease the rate of temporary layoff.  Moreover, in Model 4, the density of temporary layoff 
significantly increases, not decreases, the rate of permanent layoff. Therefore, for the case at 
hand, the density of one type of layoff mostly legitimizes, rather than delegitimizes, the other 
form. Nevertheless, the results reported in Models 3 and 6 suggest that these effects are also 
significantly contingent on the public policy regime. First, when combined with the period 
indictor for the 1980s in Model 3, the coefficient for the density of permanent layoff become 
significantly positive (3.546=-0.237+3.783), meaning that it has a positive effect on the rate of 84 
 
temporary in the 1980s. Second, the combined coefficient with the period indicator in Model 6 is 
close to zero (0.046=1.196-1.150), meaning that the positive effect of temporary-layoff density 
on the rate of permanent layoff is limited only to the period after the 1980s. These results, 
together, suggest that the cultural-cognitive legitimacy of temporary layoff was significantly 
undermined after the 1980s. In the 1980s, some firms seeking to adjust workforce continued to 
turn to temporary layoff when many others within the same sector turned away from it and 
towards permanent layoff. This was not the case anymore after the 1980s. In that period, most 
firms turned to permanent layoff even when some other firms in the same sector tried temporary 
layoff.  
 
3.5.3  Control Variables 
Most control variables have an expected effect. First of all, all of my measures of a firm’s 
shareholder-value orientation increase the rate of permanent layoff. Some of them—ownership 
by blockholding institutions and failure to meet analyst forecasts—also increase the rate of 
temporary layoff, but others have no significant effect, except for the CFO variable that has a 
significantly negative effect. As for other control variables, poor firm performance, large 
workforce, other corporate restructuring events (acquisitions and divestitures), and worsening 
macroeconomic conditions generally increase the hazard rate of both temporary and permanent 
layoffs. Reflecting the trend in Figure 1, temporary layoffs become less frequent over time, 
while permanent layoffs become more frequent.  
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In the 1980s, the layoff policies of many large U.S. companies changed from temporary 
suspension of employment to permanent termination. While firms once temporarily laid off 
workers during economic downturns and recalled them when the overall economic conditions 
improved, now even firms with healthy profits cut jobs on a massive scale in a bid to impress the 
financial community. Previous studies suggest that powerful shareholders and shareholder-value 
oriented managers promoted this change, and that, although initially contested, it was gradually 
taken for granted (Budros 1997; 2002; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Hirsch and De Soucey 2006). In 
suggesting this, however, these previous studies leave out an important aspect of the process—
the resistance from workers and their unions. This paper fills in the gap in the sociological 
literature of downsizing. I explore the role of labor unions in resisting the change and explain 
why their resistance failed to prevent it. My findings suggest that unions attempted not only to 
maintain temporary layoff but also to discourage permanent layoff, but that their ability to do 
both was significantly curtailed in the 1980s by the government’s anti-labor, pro-business stance.  
One of the two main theoretical contributions of this paper is to elaborate the role played 
by public policy in institutional change, through its influence over inter-group power struggles. 
Although the United States is often regarded as an example of a weak state, it exerts 
considerable influence over the behavior, by shaping and reshaping the institutional environment 
of firms in favor of certain groups over others (Campbell and Lindberg 1990; 1997; Dobbin and 
Dowd 2000; Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Fligstein 1990; 2001). My analysis of layoff policies in 
large U.S. firms provides another piece of supportive evidence. My findings suggest that the 
anti-union, pro-business approach of the Reagan Administration facilitated the transition from 
temporary to permanent layoff, precisely by affecting the balance of power between 
management and labor. This effect of public policy, although indirect, proved to be enduring. 86 
 
Although the stance of subsequent administrations towards labor unions became less 
confrontational, permanent layoff continued to prevail over temporary layoff long after the 
Reagan era.   
The other theoretical contribution of this paper is to explore the inter-relationships 
between Scott’s (1995) three sources of legitimacy—regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive ones. The role of the state in conferring or withdrawing legitimacy has been 
extensively studied (Baum and Oliver 1991; 1992; Dobbin and Dowd 1997; Fligstein 1990; 
Ingram and Simons 2000; Ruef and Scott 1998; Simons and Ingram 2003). Building on the 
previous studies, my analysis examines how this regulative legitimacy reinforces other sources 
of legitimacy—in this case, cognitive-cultural legitimacy. While it is a widely accepted that the 
prevalence of a given organizational structure or practice indicates its cognitive-cultural 
legitimacy (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Tolbert and Zucker 1983), this paper explores how 
public policy affects this density-dependent process. I show that the anti-union, pro-business 
stand of the U.S. government in the 1980s reinforced the legitimation process for permanent 
layoff but dampened the process for temporary layoff. Hence, in the 1980s, firms engaged in 
permanent layoff when many of their industry peers did the same but not in temporary layoff 
even when other firms did.  
Further research on the role of public policy in institutional change is warranted, 
especially given the contested nature of institutional change itself. While early work tends to 
describe institutional change as an apolitical process driven by taken-for-granted cognitive 
schemas and common cultural norms, more recent work emphasizes political aspects of the 
process, involving competing interest groups within as well as without of organizations 
(Clemens and Cook 1999; Friedland and Alford 1991; Kim et al. 2007; King and Pearce 2010; 87 
 
Pache and Santos 2010; Seo and Creed 2002). According to these studies, institutional change 
results from inter-group politics involving not only those who push for change but also those 
who maintain the status quo (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Fiss and Zajac 2004; Ingram and 
Rao 2004; Schneiberg and Bartley 2001). This emphasis on political process helps overcome the 
criticism that early work pays insufficient attention to the role of agency and power (DiMaggio 
1988; Mizruchi and Fein 1999; Perrow 1986). At the same time, however, the new emphasis 
raises the thorny issue of what social and political conditions and processes determine the 
outcome of inter-group power struggle, which ultimately determines the course and outcome of 
institutional change. The findings of this paper suggest that public policy can play a crucial role 
in this regard, by shaping the “political opportunity structure” for different groups (McAdam 
1982). My findings suggest that the policy regime in the 1980s significantly contributed to the 
shift from temporary to permanent layoff by weakening the influence of labor unions and 
ideologically supporting the latter form of layoff. Future research could usefully examine how 
political struggles among interest groups over the course of institutional change shift under 
different policy regimes.  
The resistance from unions, although it fell short of preventing the shift from temporary 
to permanent layoff in the 1980s, nonetheless reveals the political tension over the change. In 
fact, the effect of union membership and strike activity on the rate of both temporary and 
permanent layoff after the 1980s is remarkable, despite the waning political influence of labor 
unions. Because union membership declined steadily from its peak in the 1960s, and the level of 
strike activity slid precipitously in the 1980s, skeptics might expect no significant effect of labor 
unions on firms’ decision about layoffs. Indeed, what occurred in the 1980s under the anti-union, 
pro-business policy regime seems to confirm this view; my analysis shows that neither union 88 
 
membership nor strike activity affected both forms of layoff in the 1980s. What happened after 
the 1980s, however, suggests something quite different. Unions, although indeed significantly 
weakened, still provided some buffer against the spread of massive layoffs. My results 
demonstrate that, after the 1980s, union membership increased the rate of temporary layoff and 
that strike activity decreased the rate of permanent layoff. Whether these findings reflect the 
revitalization of the union movement in the 1990s (Clawson and Clawson 1999; Voss and 
Sherman 2000) or more conciliatory approaches of firms to unions in the improving economic 
conditions of the 1990s, they demonstrate that unions clearly played an important role and thus 
strong suggest that their role should not neglected.  
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4  MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
  WORKFORCE DOWNSIZING BY FIRMS 
 
Since Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal papers, 
organizational institutionalists have done extensive research on diffusion of formal structure and 
policies across organizations. Meyer and Rowan (1977) posit that organizations adopt externally-
legitimized practices in order to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of important constituents 
including customers, suppliers, competitors, and regulatory agencies. Building on this initial 
insight, DiMaggio and Power (1983) propose three theoretical mechanisms—coercive, mimetic 
and normative—through which such externally-legitimized practices diffuse from one 
organization to another. Studies have shown that organizations within a given field become 
homogeneous as they adopt similar practices (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Edelman 1990; Fligstein 
1985; Haveman 1993; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillen 2005; Mezias 1990; Tolbert and Zucker 1983).  
Despite their contribution to our understanding of the normative dimension of 
organizational behavior, however, these studies mostly focus on the adoption of policies and fail 
to consider implementation. This is regrettable in that more research is needed regarding policy 
implementation as a critical stage of institutional change (Campbell 2004; Halliday and 
Carruthers 2009). Studies that examine how formally adopted policies are implemented show 
that there is considerable variation in the way that such policies are actually implemented (Fiss 
and Zajac 2004; Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury 2009; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997; 
Westphal and Zajac 2001; Zbaracki 1998). In addition, recent studies that have examined policy 
implementation suggest that it is a highly contentious process, even more so than policy adoption, 
involving opponents as well as supporters of a given policy (Halliday and Carruthers 2009; 90 
 
Henisz and Zelner 2005; Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn 2009). Without considering the 
implementation stage, therefore, one might risk overestimating the extent to which institutional 
diffusion makes organizations homogenous, while underestimating the contested nature of the 
institutional change.  
In this paper, I develop a socio-political account of policy implementation. I build on the 
notion that organizations are embedded in a complex web of power relations involving 
competing interest groups (Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Friedland and Alford 1991; Granovetter 
1985; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Prechel 2000; Roy 1997). I discuss how being embedded in 
multitudinal power relations constrains as well as enhances the ability of organizations to 
implement formally adopted policies. In general, sustained pressure from supporters of a given 
policy limits their ability to not implement the adopted policy, while resistance from opponents 
constrains their ability to implement the same policy. Intra-organizational groups also play a 
significant role in the presence of such conflicting demands, choosing to implement adopted 
policies only when doing so serves their own interests. By considering the influence of political-
structural factors on policy implementation, I depart from an approach that focuses on the 
strategic motivations of organizations. It has been suggested that organizations actively manage 
conflicting demands arising from multiple institutional logics by formally adopting policies 
without implementing them fully (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
Oliver 1991). In fact, prior research shows that such a “decoupling” strategy is prevalent in the 
presence of conflicting institutional demands (Basu, Dirsmith, and Gupta 1999; Edelman 1992; 
Elsbach and Sutton 1992; Kostova and Roth 2002; Westphal and Zajac 1998). But I argue that 
there exist limits on the extent to which organizations can appease institutional demands by 91 
 
decoupling, and that the tension resulting from conflicting demands can also constrain the ability 
of organizations to move strategically.  
I test my argument with an analysis of the implementation of workforce downsizing plans 
announced by leading U.S. firms. This provides an ideal case for testing how conflicting 
institutional demands affect the ability of firms to implement formally adopted policies. Since 
the 1980s, leading U.S. firms have begun to announce massive downsizing plans under the 
banner of maximizing shareholder value, but there remains skepticism about how seriously firms 
implement these plans. Even when firms actually implement them, the magnitude of workforce 
reduction may fall short of what is announced. I argue that this uncertainty over the 
implementation of downsizing reflects the influence of groups with conflicting interests in and 
around the firm. Shareholders, often represented by large institutional investors who have been 
staunch advocates of the logic of shareholder primacy, have actively promoted downsizing as a 
means of enhancing corporate performance; at the same time, employees represented by labor 
unions have fiercely resisted the logic of shareholder primacy and hence the idea that jobs can be 
sacrificed to enhance shareholder value. Additionally, managers may not actively embrace the 
logic of shareholder primacy but may nonetheless engage in and implement downsizing, so long 
as it serves their own interests.  
Using a sample of 694 companies between 1984 and 2005, I examine how these three 
interest groups influence two aspects of implementation—the post-announcement reduction in 
overall employment size and the reduction in the relative proportion of managerial workforce. 
My results demonstrate the contrasting influences of the three groups, which in turn reflect their 
conflicting interests regarding the implementation of downsizing. Such findings suggest that 92 
 
firms are embedded in a delicate web of power relations, and that multiple, often conflict 
institutional demands inherent in such a web can constrain their ability to act strategically.  
 
4.1  CONFLICTING INSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS AND POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Policy implementation (whether and how organizations implement formally adopted policies), 
although less studied than policy adoption, was raised as one of the central issues at the 
beginning of organizational institutionalism. In their seminal paper, Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
suggest that when organizations adopt new policies in order to conform to the demands of their 
external constituents, which may be expressed as legal mandates or simply as public opinion, 
such policies can conflict with core technical activities of those organizations. To avoid such 
tensions, they suggest, organizations decouple formally adopted policies from other core 
activities. As such, decoupling was initially discussed to indicate the need for organizations to 
conform to externally legitimized demands, but subsequent research has instead emphasized the 
strategic aspect of decoupling. In a widely cited paper, Oliver (1991) adds to the original insight 
from Meyer and Rowan this strategic consideration, suggesting that organizations can actively 
manage external demands, rather than passively conform to them, by strategically decoupling 
adoption from implementation when it is to their advantage.  
Empirical studies have shown that various decoupling strategies indeed work well, when 
organizations are confronted with conflicting institutional demands (Elsbach and Sutton 1992; 
Westphal and Zajac 1994; 1998; Zajac and Westphal 2004). In a series of studies on executive 
compensation practices, Westphal and Zajac (1994; 1998) show that management “symbolically” 
manage external demands from investors while still maintaining their discretion over executive 93 
 
compensation, by adopting but not fully implementing long-term incentive plans for chief 
executives. They show that even the mere adoption of such plans may lead to positive stock-
market reactions, regardless of its implementation (Westphal and Zajac 1998). This kind of 
symbolic management is especially prevalent when there are multiple institutional demands 
(Basu, Dirsmith, and Gupta 1999; Kostova and Roth 2002). For instance, organizations have to 
deal with multiple regulatory agencies that make conflicting demands. In such a case, symbolic 
management allows organizations to selectively address concerns of certain institutional 
constituents while making symbolic gestures to the remainder, so that the organizations save face 
with their constituents.  
This kind of strategic view of decoupling enhances our understanding of the relationship 
between organizations and their institutional environments. Most importantly, it helps overcome 
one limitation of organizational institutionalism, namely its inattention to the strategic aspect of 
organizational response to institutional demands (Oliver 1991). At the same time, however, the 
strategic view risks overestimating an organization’s ability to manage external demands and 
underestimating the constraints placed upon it by its institutional constituents. For one thing, 
there are limits on the extent to which organizations can appease institutional demands with only 
symbolic gestures, in the face of third-party monitoring or regulatory surveillance (Short and 
Toffel 2010; Zuckerman 1999). For another thing, while the presence of conflicting institutional 
demands can create latitude for organizations to exercise some level of strategic choice, by 
pitting one group of constituents against another (Clemens and Cook 1999; Dorado 2005; Seo 
and Creed 2002), the tension resulting from conflicting demands can also constrain an 
organization’s ability to take decisive action (Pache and Santos 2010). Decoupling may, in fact, 94 
 
reflect an organization’s inability to implement adopted policies, rather than its intentional 
decision not to implement.  
Hence, to better understand policy implementation, one should attend to not only the 
strategic motivations of organizations, but also to the political-structural factors that can 
constrain as well as enhance an organization’s ability to implement (or not implement) formally 
adopted policies. Organizations are embedded in a complex web of inter- and intra-
organizational power relations (Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Friedland and Alford 1991; Granovetter 
1985; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Prechel 2000; Roy 1997). The resulting political tension 
significantly affects what organizations can and cannot do, especially in the presence of multiple, 
competing institutional logics (Dunn and Jones 2010; Friedland and Alford 1991; Marquis and 
Lounsbury 2007; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003; Stryker 2000). Prior research on diffusion have 
shown that the presence of groups embracing competing logics can politicize the diffusion 
process, some facilitating the adoption of a given practice, others impeding it (Fiss and Zajac 
2004; Greenwood et al. 2010; Ingram and Rao 2004; Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Schneper and 
Guillen 2004). The availability of an alternative logic encourages institutional entrepreneurs to 
challenge the status quo (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert 2005). But 
at the same time, competition between logics prevents one logic from becoming predominant, 
making drastic changes or reforms difficult (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005).  
One would expect the political tension arising from conflicting demands also to have 
significant implications for policy implementation, probably even more so than for policy 
adoption. The inter-group tension at the point of adoption often continues or even intensifies 
during implementation (Halliday and Carruthers 2007; Henisz and Zelner 2005; Zelner, Henisz, 
and Holburn 2009). In a study of bankruptcy law reforms in developing countries, Halliday and 95 
 
Carruthers (2007; 2009) demonstrate how contentious the implementation of formally adopted 
policies can be. Starting in the 1990s, in response to pressure from international organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, many developing countries adopted a 
new bankruptcy law that met western standards. In many cases, however, local interest groups, 
such as local government officers and legal professionals, fiercely resisted radical reforms and 
attempted to defend their privileges. As a result, many key elements of the new bankruptcy 
regime were either repealed or compromised. Other studies on externally imposed reforms find 
similar patterns of retrenchment or lack of implementation (Hafner‐Burton and Tsutsui 2005; 
Weber et al. 2009; Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn 2009).  
The ability of organizations to implement a formally adopted policy is, then, critically 
dependent on the multitudinal power-relations in which the organizations are embedded. On the 
one hand, strict monitoring and continuing pressure from key institutional constituents is likely 
to discourage decoupling, by increasing the risk of punishment. On the other hand, resistance 
from other constituents who are negatively affected by a new policy can severely constrain the 
ability of organizations to implement formally adopted policies, even when they are genuinely 
willing to do so. Even if such groups fail to block the adoption of a policy that they resist, they 
may persist in their resistance by hindering its implementation. In the presence of such 
conflicting demands, one would expect the role of internal groups also to be crucial (Kim et al. 
2007; Pache and Santos 2010). The outcome of policy implementation will depend on the 
interest of organizational decision makers after adoption; they may be initially enthusiastic about 
new policies, but, once they achieve the appearance of conformity, they may lose interest in 
implementing policies unless doing so serves their own interests. In the following, I apply this 96 
 
socio-political account to the implementation of workforce downsizing plans announced by 
leading U.S. firms.  
 
4.2  WORKFORCE DOWNSIZING AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
In response to growing pressure from shareholders, leading U.S. companies have invented and 
promoted various strategies to demonstrate their commitment to shareholder-value maximization, 
such as governance reforms and strategic changes (Dobbin and Zorn 2005). Workforce 
downsizing is another such strategy (Budros 1999; 2002; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan 2000). Traditionally, companies laid off employees, mostly on a temporary basis, 
during economic downturns (Cappelli 1999; Osterman 1999). Permanent downsizings were 
relatively rare, and large-scale ones were even rarer. This has drastically changed since the 1980s. 
Throughout the recessionary 1980s, downsizing became so prevalent that when the economic 
conditions improved in the mid-1990s, even profitable companies engaged in downsizing; many 
firms regarded it as an essential business strategy to maintain competitive cost structures (Hirsch 
and De Soucey 2006; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000). Fortune 500 companies like Kodak and 
Xerox announced massive downsizing plans even as they reported profits in the 1990s. In 1994, 
according to one estimate, while corporate profits rose 11% (after a 13% rise in 1993), corporate 
America cut 516,069 jobs; this was far more than in the recession year of 1990, when 316,047 
jobs were eliminated (Murray 1995). While massive downsizing might have indicated failed 
management in the past, it has now become a measure that shows off management’s “bare-
knuckled resolve” (Grimsley 1995).  
The primary purpose of such downsizing is clearly to foster positive market reactions. 
Although the evidence of empirical studies is mixed (Caves and Krepps 1993; Hallock 1998; Lee 97 
 
1997; Palmon, Sun, and Tang 1997; Worrell, Davidson, and Sharma 1991), there are still many 
eye-catching cases of downsizing announcements leading to significant increases in stock price. 
The day when Sears announced it was discarding 50,000 jobs, its stock rose almost 4 percent; the 
day when Xerox said it would prune 10,000 jobs, its stock surged 7 percent (Uchitelle 1996). 
Given that firms tend to imitate their successful peers (Haveman 1993), these kinds of examples 
have tempted other firms to follow suit, in order to boost or restore share price. Previous studies 
show that a decline in share price is one of the most significant predictors of downsizing 
announcements in the 1990s (Budros 1997). Another indication that firms attempt to shape 
market reactions through downsizing announcements is the tendency of companies to announce a 
downsizing plan when they fail to meet securities analysts’ forecasts. While stock price once 
fluctuated on the strength of actual profits, it now rises and falls on the strength of analyst 
forecasts of profits (Dobbin and Zorn 2005). The CEO of Sun Microsystems, when announcing a 
plan to cut 5,000 jobs in 2006, emphasized that the expected cost savings from the cuts would 
help the company meet the consensus analyst forecast, even though that forecast was of a loss of 
2 cents a share (Flynn 2006).  
Given this emphasis on apparent intention, an intriguing question is whether or to what 
degree firms actually implement their announced downsizing plans. Baumol and his colleagues 
(2003, p. 40-2) find that many firms that had announced a downsizing plan ended up with a labor 
force of roughly the same size or even larger than that before the announcement. This does not 
necessarily mean that companies attempt to cheat investors. What seems to occur, instead, is that 
companies rely on mere headcount cuts without making other difficult but necessary 
restructuring efforts (Gordon 1996; Harrison and Bluestone 1988). Consequently, when demand 
increases, such companies scramble to hire more employees (Prinstin 1998). Nevertheless, the 98 
 
finding by Baumol and his colleagues still suggests that downsizing is not fully implemented 
even though investors had been promised that it would be. Companies increasingly emphasize 
their downsizing plans as a part of broader restructuring efforts that entail drastic changes to 
workforce structure. The market also reacts positively to downsizing announcements framed in 
this way (De Meuse et al. 1994; Worrell et al. 1991). The fact that many firms end up with the 
same or even a larger workforce than before downsizing announcements, however, suggests that 
such drastic changes are unlikely to occur.  
Less-than-full implementation is also apparent in the limited effect of downsizing on 
managerial jobs. Reducing the proportion of jobs not directly related to value-generating 
activities is one of the primary purposes of downsizing (Hammer and Champy 1993). Market 
reactions are also more likely to be positive when the announced downsizing involves a 
reduction in managerial jobs, suggesting that the market views such downsizing as creating value 
(Caves and Krepps 1993; Love and Nohria 2005). Nonetheless, research shows that downsizings 
do not lead to a significant reduction in managerial jobs (Baumol et al. 2003). One recent study 
even finds that the proportion of managerial jobs increases, rather than decreases, after 
downsizing, and suggests that this indicates the re-emergence of managerialism (Goldstein 2012). 
The implication may be that top managers are apathetic when it comes to streamlining 
overgrown managerial ranks (Gordon 1996).  
 
4.3  INTER-GROUP STRUGGLE OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
DOWNSIZING 
One possible reason for loose implementation of announced downsizing plans is that firms 
announce such plans mainly as a symbolic gesture to appease the financial community. It has 99 
 
been widely observed that the market often responds positively to announced policy changes 
even when those policies lack substantive plans for implementation (Westphal and Zajac 1998; 
Zajac and Westphal 2004). Companies may initially be interested in impressing market 
participants with drastic downsizing plans but, once this kind of impression management is 
accomplished, may become less interested in implementing such plans (Elsbach 1994; Elsbach 
and Sutton 1992). I suggest, however, below that this lax implementation also reflects political 
tensions resulting from conflicting external demands and the selective internal response to the 
conflicting demands. In particular, I attend to the influence of institutional investors, labor unions, 
and managers, over two post-announcement reductions involved in implementation: in the total 
number employees and in the proportion of managerial employees.  
 
4.3.1  Pressure from Institutional Investors 
Pressure from external constituents is one of the primary reasons for formal adoption of policies 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). The question is whether such external 
groups continue to monitor and pressure organizations to implement the adopted policies. To the 
extent that they actually do, they discourage organizations from not implementing the adopted 
policy. Because of information asymmetry, such external monitoring may only be effective in a 
limited way. In the capital market, for instance, dispersed ownership reduces the ability and 
incentives of individual investors to monitor the behavior of managers (Berle and Means 1933). 
Concentration of share ownership, however, may enhance the effectiveness of external 
monitoring. What has been significant in this respect is the growth of market intermediaries, such 
as institutional investors, who have actively promoted the logic of shareholder-value 
maximization, and who over the past several decades, institutional investors have gained 100 
 
considerable influence over corporate decision-making (Dobbin and Jung 2012; Dobbin and 
Zorn 2005). Such investors, who, for example, manage large mutual funds or public pension 
assets, often own a large block of shares of a given company. Because of this, they cannot easily 
liquidate their holdings even when a company faces difficulty—any attempt to do so would 
further depress the value of their holdings—and therefore have more incentive to monitor 
management than smallholding individual investors (Davis and Thompson 1994; Useem 1996).  
Pressure from institutional investors has been a significant factor behind many recent 
corporate adoptions of workforce downsizing plans (Jung 2012), and such investors are unlikely 
to be satisfied only with plan adoption but are likely to be concerned with how the adopted plans 
are actually implemented. This is because downsizing plans are risky and will produce expected 
profit-boosting effects only when firms implement them as planned. Downsizing may improve 
the overall cost structure of firms, but it can be costly in the short run because firms usually have 
to incur considerable restructuring charges upfront (e.g., severance expenses). Studies suggest 
that most firms that engage in downsizing fail to improve profits even in the long run (Cascio, 
Young, and Morris 1997; De Meuse, Vanderheiden, and Bergmann 1994). Hence, institutional 
investors are likely to be highly concerned with the manner in which adopted downsizing plans 
are implemented over a considerable period of time, in order to ensure that anticipated cost 
savings are achieved.  
Hypothesis 1: Pressure from institutional investors will accelerate post-announcement reduction 
in both the total number of employees and the proportion of managerial employees.  
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While external pressure from some constituents accelerates the implementation of policies, 
resistance from others has an opposite effect. Resistance from key constituents discourages the 
adoption of a given policy (Schneper and Guillen 2004), but even after the policy is formally 
adopted, their resistance may not subside soon. More often than not, formal adoption is only the 
beginning of a long process of institutional change. Recent studies on the local implementation 
of globally-diffusing policies illustrate this point well. Halliday and Carruthers (2009) show how 
local interest groups contested corporate bankruptcy reforms enacted by developing countries 
under international pressures, resulting in considerable differences in the way the reforms were 
implemented across countries. Zelner et al. (2009) document a similar case, in which national 
governments reinstated electricity-liberalization policies in response to negative public sentiment. 
This kind of political dynamic can be expected, in the implementation of adopted 
downsizing plans, primarily through resistance from labor unions. In the postwar period, labor 
unions championed the industrial-union model of employment relations, where unions and 
employers set the rules regarding wages, benefits, working hours, job descriptions, and layoff 
terms (Kochan et al. 1994; Osterman 1999). In the 1980s, firms attempted to dismantle such 
rules and to evade collective bargaining (Meyer and Cooke 1993), but labor unions vehemently 
resisted such attempts. As a result, workforce downsizing has become an object of intense 
political struggle between employers and unions. Unions have attempted to prevent firms from 
implementing downsizing plans by using confrontational tactics such as work stoppages and, at 
the same time have promoted their preferred form of workforce reduction: temporary layoffs 
with promise of recall (Jung 2012). Even when unions have failed to prevent firms from adopting 
downsizing plans, they have attempted to exert influence over how they are implemented. As 
least for union members, who are protected by collective bargaining agreements, firms have 102 
 
typically negotiated with unions about the pace and terms of layoffs and other issues such as 
severance packages. Some unions have also directly challenged on-going downsizing. For 
instance, the strikes by United Auto Workers (UAW) at two General Motors parts factories 
significantly delayed the company’s downsizing efforts (Bradsher 1998). Hence, I expect to find 
in my data that resistance from unions will hinder rapid and thorough implementation of adopted 
downsizing plans.  
While union resistance may impede the overall pace of implementation, however, it may 
facilitate another aspect of implementation—the reduction in the relative proportion of 
managerial jobs. When pressured by firms to make concessions—such as work rule changes, 
wage cuts, and layoffs—labor unions often call for similar sacrifice from white-collar workers. 
When steel companies, hurt by recessions and imports in the 1980s, pressured unionized workers 
to make concessions, the present of the United Steelworkers of America countered that the 
companies would have to institute reforms first, including reducing what he said were excessive 
layers of supervisors and other white-collar managers (Serrin 1986). And firms sometimes do 
increase white-collar job cuts in an apparent attempt to mollify their unionized workforce. After 
the eight-week strike over GM’s downsizing plan, the company announced a sweeping 
reorganization, which included elimination of as many as 1,000 white-collar jobs (Krebs 1998). 
Hypothesis 2: Resistance from labor unions will delay the post-announcement reduction in the 
total number of employees, but will accelerate the post-announcement reduction in the 
proportion of managerial employees.  
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The self-interest of managers is yet a third factor that determines the implementation of formally 
adopted policies. Even at the adoption stage, managers exert considerable influence over which 
policies are adopted and which are not. Dobbin and Jung (2012), for instance, show that although 
institutional investors have promoted a set of agency-theory prescriptions to maximize 
shareholder value, executives have embraced only those prescriptions that serve their own 
interest (e.g., stock option grants), while resisting others that might constrain their power (e.g., 
governance reforms). Given the influence of managers over the adoption of policies, even after a 
firm does adopt a certain policy, managerial influence, based on self-interest, will significantly 
determine the level of implementation (Westphal and Zajac 2001). 
Under what circumstances, then, do managers come to have greater incentive to more 
fully implement adopted downsizing plans? One important factor is the structure of executive 
compensation. Studies have shown that equity-based compensation practices, which tie executive 
compensation to the performance of a given firm’s stock, create strong incentives for managers 
to pursue strategies that maximize share price (Sanders 2001; Sanders and Hambrick 2007). 
Firms whose CEOs are paid mostly in stock options are, in fact, more likely to make downsizing 
announcements than firms whose CEOs are mostly paid in cash (Jung 2012). To the extent that 
implementation of announced downsizing plans enhances the firm’s stock price, equity-based 
compensation may also facilitate its implementation.  
Therefore, I expect that equity-compensated managers will facilitate the implementation 
of announced downsizing plans, thus leading to more rapid reductions in the overall employment 
level. They, however, may not be equally active in executing another aspect of the 
implementation—the reduction in managerial jobs. Despite the prevailing rhetoric against the 
bloated corporate bureaucracies of the 1990s, Gordon (1996) argues, the spread of workforce 104 
 
downsizing has failed to remove them; instead, it has increased the bureaucratic burden of 
supervising less-motivated workers, rather ironically fattening corporate bureaucracies. A recent 
study by Goldstein (2012) study, using industry level data, provides support for this argument; 
the prevalence of downsizing is positively correlated with the proportion of managerial workers 
and the valuation of managerial work.  
Hypothesis 3: The self-interest of managers will accelerate the post-announcement reduction in 
the total number of employees but not the post-announcement reduction in the proportion 
of managerial employees.  
 
4.4  DATA AND METHOD 
I present fixed-effects models of the implementation of announced downsizing plans for the 
period 1984-2005. The fixed effects allow me to determine whether changes in independent 
variables are followed by changes in dependent variables. Hence, the main effect of downsizing 
announcements will test whether they actually lead to reductions in both total and managerial 
workforce. The interaction effects of downsizing announcements with other mediating factors 
will test whether and how external pressure from institutional investors, resistance from labor 
unions, and self-interests of managers affect the implementation of those announced downsizing 
plans. 
 
4.4.1  Sample  
The original sample included 789 large U.S. companies that were traded between 1965 and 2006. 
The primary sampling frame is Fortune’s list of America’s largest firms. I and my collaborators 
in data collection stratified the sample by industry, selecting a roughly equal number of firms 105 
 
from 23 industries.
7 The majority of industries (16 out of 23) were sampled exclusively from the 
Fortune Industrial 500, and the remainder were from specialized Fortune lists. For entertainment 
and health care, we used Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory for years before 1983, at 
which point Fortune began to cover these industries. Another important aspect of our sample is 
that, unlike most longitudinal studies of large firms that use samples drawn at the beginning, we 
sampled firms evenly across the entire observation period. This ensures that our sample is not 
biased toward successful firms in later years and includes firms in growing as well as declining 
industries. The final sample contained 789 firms. For the present study, I use data on 694 firms 
that were listed as companies between 1984 and 2005.  
 
4.4.2  Dependent Variables 
Two dependent variables are used to capture the actual implementation of announced downsizing 
plans. The first dependent variable is the percentage change in the total number of employees, 
which is calculated as follows:  
 [(total number of employeest – total number of employeest-1)/total number of employeest-1]×100. 
The second dependent variable is the log-odds of managerial employees, which measures 
the proportion of managerial employees relative to that of non-managerial employees. It is 
calculated as follows:  
log(proportion of managerial employeest/proportion of non-managerial employeest). 
 
4.4.3  Independent Variables 
To construct an indicator variable for downsizing announcements, I collected information on the 
history of downsizing announcements for the sampled firms. Following Budros (1999), I define 
                                                 
7 See Footnote 1.   106 
 
downsizing as permanent personnel reduction. This definition excludes announcements of 
temporary layoffs and sales of assets. Data on downsizing announcements were obtained through 
extensive archival search. The primary source was the Lexis/Nexis electronic database. The 
database catalogues most major newspapers, such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York 
Times, and several newswire services. Rather than limiting sources to one or two major 
newspapers—a tactic that previous studies have often adopted—I used all possible sources, 
including local newspapers. For each announcement, I read the contents carefully and dropped 
cases that referred to downsizing plans announced earlier. Using these data on downsizing 
announcements, I construct two binary variables, coded as one when there was a downsizing 
announcement by a given firm one year or two years, respectively, before a given year.  
The indicator variables of downsizing announcements are interacted with variables 
measuring the influence of three interest groups—institutional investors, labor unions, and 
option-compensated executives—to examine how their influence affects the pace and the 
magnitude of the implementation of announced downsizing plans. First, pressure from 
institutional investors is measured by the percentage of a firm’s stock owned by institutional 
investors, assuming that a firm will be under greater monitoring by these investors when a large 
portion of its shares is controlled by them. The information about ownership by institutional 
investors is from Thomson Financial’s institutional ownership database.  
Second, union resistance is measured by union membership at the industry level, 
assuming that firms in industries with high union membership will be more exposed to union 
resistance. The data on annual, industry-level union membership are provided by Hirsch and 
Macpherson (2003), via their website (http://www.unionstats.com). Their estimates are based on 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) methods. Because 107 
 
many firms have operations in more than one industry, I calculate a weighted average of union 
membership at industries in which a firm has operations. The weight for an industry is the 
portion of the firm’s sales from that industry. This information is from Compustat’s segment 
database.  
Finally, the self-interest of managers are measured by the ratio of stock options to the 
CEO’s total compensation, assuming that managers will have more incentive in implementing 
downsizing when a considerable portion of their compensation tied to their firms’ stock market 
performance. Because Compustat’s Execomp database, the primary source for executive 
compensation data, began in 1992 to report stock option values, which are calculated using the 
Black-Scholes-Merton method, I explore the effects of compensation in separate models, with a 
one-year lag, for only the period of 1993-2005. In addition to the ratio of stock options, I also 
include total CEO compensation as a control variable.  
 
4.4.4  Control Variables 
I include several control variables that may affect the change in employment size and the 
proportion of managerial workforce. Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics. All variables 
included in the analyses vary annually and are lagged by one year so that they reflect the state in 
the previous fiscal year. First of all, several measures of firm performance and financial status 
are included. Cumulative stock returns (the change in share price over the previous 12 months) 
measure a firm’s stock-market performance. Return on assets (ROA) is the most widely used 
measure of a firm’s operating performance. Debt-to-equity ratio is included as a measure of a 
firm’s financial leverage.  
 108 
 
   
Data Sources Mean S.D.
% Change in the Total Employment Compustat 1.423 18.819
Log Odds of Managerial employees EEO-1 Reports -1.938 0.476
Downsizing, t-1 0.178 0.383
Downsizing, t-2 0.174 0.379
Institutional Ownership Thompson Financail 49.617 22.357
Labor Union Density Unionstat.com 19.320 13.909
CEO Stock Options Execomp 0.320 0.267
CEO Compensation Execomp 8.100 1.020
Cumulative Stock Returns CRSP 0.190 0.548
Return on Assets Compustat 2.732 22.904
Debt-to-Equity Ratio Compustat 0.668 29.798
Board Independence S&P Registers 74.716 14.587
Analyt Coverage IBES 2.308 0.864
CEO=Chair S&P Registers 0.696 0.460
CEO Tenure S&P Registers 1.687 0.980
Chief Financial Officer S&P Registers 0.622 0.485
Diversification Compustat 0.427 0.491
Acquisitions SDC Platinum 0.047 0.238
Divestitures SDC Platinum 0.387 1.060
PPE per Employee Compustat 3.980 1.311
Employees Compustat 2.645 1.200
Total Assets Compustat 7.564 1.596
Table 4.1: Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics109 
 
The presence of monitoring mechanisms other than the one by institutional investors may 
also reduce the chance that an announced downsizing plan is not under-implemented. As for 
internal monitoring, it is often assumed that the more independent directors are from 
management, the more effective the internal monitoring by the board of directors will be. Board 
independence is measured by the percentage of outside directors on the board. Outside directors 
are defined as any directors not employed by the firm. Monitoring by securities analysts provides 
another mechanism for external monitoring, which is measured by the number of securities 
analysts covering a firm. A firm is assumed to be under greater monitoring by these analysts 
when there are many analysts covering the firm. This variable is log-transformed to correct for 
its heavily right-skewed distribution. 
To control for the influence of powerful CEOs over the implementation process, two 
measures of CEO power are also included (Westphal and Zajac 2001). A binary variable is used, 
which is coded one for firm-years when a firm’s CEO is also the chair of the board. CEO tenure 
is the number of years the incumbent had held the position. The role of other high rank 
executives is considered by including a binary variable for chief financial officers (CFOs), a role 
which has recently been used to promote cost-saving measures such as downsizing (Jung 2012).  
To control for the effects of restructuring events other than workforce downsizing, the 
number of acquisitions and divestitures, respectively, completed by a focal firm in the previous 
fiscal quarter is included. The extent to which a firm’s operation is spread across multiple 
industries is captured by the entropy index of diversification (Palepu 1985). This variable is 
expected to have a positive effect on both the total number of employees and the proportion of 
managerial workforce. Investment in new technology is measured using a firm’s net 110 
 
expenditures in property, plant, and equipment (PPE) per employee. A firm’s workforce size is 
the total number of employees. Finally, firm size is measured as total assets. 
 
4.4.5  Missing Values and Multiple Imputation  
For some financial variables, missing values are of concern. The most severe case is the ROA 
variable; for about 15 percent of all quarterly intervals, this information is not available. For all 
other variables, the rate of missing data is less than 5 percent. Whenever the data are not missing 
completely at random, listwise deletion can yield biased estimates (Allison 2002). To address 
this problem, I estimated missing values for these variables using multiple imputation, using a 
multiple imputation program, Amelia II (King et al. 2001). Models are robust to the exclusion of 
organization-years for which there are missing data. 
 
4.4.6  Statistical Method 
I conduct pooled cross-sectional time series analyses of longitudinal data on both the percentage 
change in the total number of employees and the log-odds of managerial employees. The firm 
fixed effects account for unobserved characteristics that do not vary over time, such as industry 
and region. The year fixed effects account for those factors that affect all firms equally (such as 
macroeconomic conditions) but vary across time. Although this fixed-effects specification 
employs a large number of parameters and thus reduces model efficiency, it provides stringent 
tests of hypotheses about how changes in independent variables affect outcomes (Greene 2008). 
The specification also offers an efficient means of dealing with non-constant variance of the 
errors (heteroskedasticity) which derives from our use of multiple observations of each firm 
(Allison 2005). 111 
 
 
4.5  RESULTS 
I present models exploring how firms implement their announced downsizing plans. The 
baseline models include all independent and control variables but do not have any interaction 
terms with the indicators of downsizing announcements. The main effects of downsizing 
announcements will reveal whether or not firms actually implement announced downsizing plans. 
I then add interaction terms of downsizing announcements with other independent variables and 
test whether and how these factors affect the pace of implementation. All models except for 
those with executive compensation variables (Models 4 and 5) cover the entire study period 
between 1984 and 2005. The models with compensation variables cover a sub-period between 
1993 and 2005, because the variables are only available from 1993, with a one-year lag. Models 
of the percentage change in the total number of employees are reported in Table 4.2, and those of 
the log-odds of managerial employees in Table 4.3. Figures 1 through 2 graphically illustrate the 
interaction effects of downsizing announcements and other explanatory variables.  
 
4.5.1  Main Effects of Downsizing Announcements 
To begin with the main effects of downsizing announcements, there is considerable evidence that 
firms actually implement their announced downsizing plans, but their implementation falls short 
in terms of reducing the proportion of non-productive workforce. Specifically, in Model 1 of 
Table 4.2, the coefficients of downsizing announcements suggest that a downsizing 
announcement, on average, leads to a reduction in total employment size of about 4 percent in  112 
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s the first year and a reduction of another one percent in the second year. These patterns remain 
more or less the same in the later period in Model 4, which replicate Model 1 with compensation 
variables for the period between 1993 and 2005, except that the magnitude of the reduction in the 
second is somewhat larger. Similar reductions are not observed, however, for the relative 
proportion of managerial employees; downsizing announcements do not lead to reduction in the 
relative proportion of those employees. In fact, there is some evidence in Model 4 of Table 4.3 
that downsizing announcements lead to an increase in the relative proportion of managerial 
employees in the later period, which confirms the claim that the managerial workforce 
reemerged in the 1990s (Goldstein 2012).  
 
4.5.2  Interaction Effects  
I now turn to the interaction effects of downsizing announcements and other key explanatory 
variables. First, there is partial and somewhat mixed support for Hypothesis 1 that external 
pressure from institutional investors facilitates the implementation of announced downsizing 
plans. The evidence of their role in accelerating the post-announcement reduction in total 
employment size is mixed. The evidence of their role in another aspect of the implementation—
the reduction in the relative proportion of managerial employees—is more consistent, but 
limitedly so in that they prevent firms from increasing the proportion of managerial employees 
but fall short of pushing firms to reduce the number. There is stronger support for both 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. Labor unions impede the first aspect of implementation but facilitate the 
second. Hence, once firms adopt a downsizing plan, labor unions attempt to lessen its impact and 
to ensure that managerial workers share some of the pain. In contrast, the self-interest of 115 
 
managers facilitates the first but not the second, suggesting that top managers are not willing to 
cut their own ranks.  
To begin with Hypothesis 1, there is evidence that monitoring by institutional investors 
significantly affects the implementation of announced downsizing plans, but some of its effect is 
unexpected. Model 2 of Table 4.2 suggests that institutional ownership slows down, rather than 
accelerates, the post-announcement reduction in total employment size in the first year. This is 
can be seen in Figure 4.1: the reduction in total employment size is larger at lower levels of 
institutional ownership, but it becomes smaller at higher levels. In the second year after a 
downsizing announcement, however, institutional ownership accelerates the reduction. The 
pattern in Figure 4.1 shows that downsizing announcements lead to a reduction after two years 
only at high levels of institutional ownership. These patterns suggest that, although institutional 
ownership may not accelerate the pace of the post-announcement reduction initially, it prolongs 
the reduction. In addition, Model 2 of Table 4.3 suggests that institutional ownership pushes 
firms to cut deep into the managerial ranks. Downsizing announcements in the previous year 
lead to a reduction in the relative proportion of managerial employees only at high levels of 
institutional ownership (see the right graph of Figure 4.1). At very low levels, downsizing 
announcements actually lead to an increase in the relative proportion of managerial employees.  
There is quite strong evidence to support Hypothesis 2 regarding resistance from labor 
unions. Model 3 of Table 4.2 suggests that, although their resistance does not impede the post-
announcement reduction in the first year, it does do so in the second year. Hence in Figure 4.2, at 
very low levels of union membership, a downsizing announcement results in a 4 percent 
reduction in total employment size in the second year, but the magnitude of this reduction 
becomes smaller as union membership in the firm’s industry increases. In addition, Model 3 of 116 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Interaction Effects with Institutional Ownership  
Note: Grey lines indicate statistically insignificant effects.   
 
Table 4.3 suggests the strong presence of labor unions pushes firms to reduce the relative size of 
managerial ranks after downsizing announcements, particularly in the second year. As is shown 
in Figure 4.2, the relative proportion of managerial employees significantly increases at low 
levels of union membership in the second year after downsizing announcements, but this positive 
effect becomes significant reduced as union membership in the firm’s industry increases. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Interaction Effects with Union Density  
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As predicted in Hypothesis 3, there is substantial evidence that managerial self-interests 
facilitate implementation, but their facilitating role is limited to reduction in total employment 
size. Model 5 of Table 4.2 provides strong evidence that CEOs whose compensation is 
predominantly equity-based are more willing to implement announced downsizing plans. As is 
shown in Figure 4.3, the magnitude of the first-year post-announcement reduction in total 
employment size is significantly dependent on the extent to which the CEO is paid in stock 
options. As its percentage increases from zero percent to 80 percent, the average magnitude of 
the reduction in the first year increases from 2 percent to 7 percent. Option-loaded CEOs, 
however, seem to have little incentive to reduce the relative size of the managerial workforce. In 
Model 5 of Table 4.3, the coefficient for the interaction term with stock options is positive but 
insignificant.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Interaction Effects with CEO Stock Options 
 
4.5.3  Control Variables 
All three measures of performance have a positive effect on the percentage change in the total 
number of employees, but their effect on the relative proportion of managerial employees is 
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inconsistent: operating performance has a negative effect but stock market performance has no 
significant effect. There is some evidence of CEO power: firms with long-tenured CEOs tend to 
increase the total employment size and to have a higher proportion of managerial employees. 
Board independence decreases total employment size, but not the proportion of managerial 
employees. The effects of other restructuring events are also observed: as expected, acquisitions 
increase employment size, but divestitures reduce it. However, neither has any effect on the 
relative proportion of managerial employees. As for diversification, it leads to an increase in both 
total employment and the relative proportion of managerial workforce. Finally, large firms in 
terms of asset size have a larger proportion of managerial employees, but employment size has 
the opposite effect.  
 
4.6  CONCLUSION 
Since the 1980s, leading U.S. firms have announced massive downsizing plans as a means of 
enhancing shareholder value. But the effectiveness of this strategy should depend on whether and 
how firms implement their announced downsizing plans. In this respect, there has been a 
suspicion that firms make the move in order to impress the financial community, but with little 
intention to fully implement those dazzling downsizing plans. One might take this as a classical 
example of decoupling where firms adopt a certain policy or practice as a gesture of conforming 
to institutional demands but do not implement them because they wish to maintain their internal 
status quo (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The alleged intention of firms to shape positive market 
reactions with massive downsizing plans even suggests that firms strategically engage in 
decoupling to actively manage their institutional environment (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; 
Westphal and Zajac 1998; Westphal and Zajac 2001).  119 
 
In this paper, I provide an alternative to this strategic perspective on decoupling. I argue 
that a lack of implementation does not necessarily indicate a given firm’s attempt to decouple 
adoption from implementation. Instead, I propose a socio-political account of policy 
implementation in which the extent to which a formally-adopted policy is actually implemented 
crucially depends on the political dynamics among groups, both inside and outside of the firm, 
with conflicting interests. From this perspective, a lack of implementation may reflect the 
political tension among such groups over the implementation of the adopted policy. My analysis 
of the implementation of announced downsizing plans by 694 leading U.S. firms between 1984 
and 2005 provides ample evidence to support my socio-political account of policy 
implementation. Specifically, I examine the role of three competing interest groups (institutional 
investors, labor unions, and corporate managers) and show that these interest groups have 
contrasting influences over two different aspects of implementation—post-announcement 
reduction in overall employment size and reduction in the relative proportion of managerial 
employees.  
In general, my analysis of the implementation of announced downsizing plans suggests 
that there exists considerable variation in the extent to which a formally-adopted policy is 
implemented, and that a significant portion of such variation in policy implementation can be 
explained by the political dynamics among interest groups in and around the firm. These findings 
have a number of theoretical implications for the literature of organizational institutionalism. The 
first important implication is that the implementation phase should be studied as a crucial 
component of the process of institutional change. Since DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
organizational institutionalists have done extensive research on the adoption or the diffusion of 
formal structures or policies. In some cases, formal adoption of new policies may be indicative 120 
 
of substantive institutional change. But in other cases, what seems more important is whether and 
how formally-adopted policies are implemented. That organizations adopt a policy is surely 
some kind of institutional change, especially when the adoption is driven by a new institutional 
demand, but, if the adopted policy is not seriously implemented, it seems hard to claim that the 
diffusion of the policy leads to substantive institutional change.  
Given the importance of implementation as a crucial part of any substantive institutional 
change, my findings of the contrasting roles of competing interest groups demonstrates that 
implementation can be a highly contested process. In short, three interest groups—institutional 
investors, labor unions, and corporate managers—have conflicting interests in the 
implementation of downsizing and thus have contrasting influences over the process. Previous 
studies on the implementation of globally-diffused policies suggest that implementing such 
policies is often plagued by local resistance (Hafner‐Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Halliday and 
Carruthers 2009; Weber et al. 2009; Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn 2009). The present study shows 
that a similar political tension exists over policy implementation at the organizational level. 
Moreover, it shows the role of some groups in facilitating implementation as well as the role of 
others in impeding implementation. The presence of powerful interest groups can not only 
impede but also facilitate institutional change, with the ultimate outcome being determined by 
the overall balance of power among groups. Hence, researchers of institutional change should 
pay more attention to the constellations of power, especially at the implementation stage.  
By demonstrating the conflicting influences of different interest groups over 
implementation, the present study suggests that there exist limits on the ability of organizations 
to strategically manage institutional demands. Recent theoretical developments in institutional 
theory suggest that the availability of competing institutional models of action creates latitude for 121 
 
organizations to exercise some level of strategic choice (Clemens and Cook 1999; Dorado 2005; 
Seo and Creed 2002; Stryker 2000). Decoupling is one example. It is suggested that decoupling 
is a common organizational tactic for dealing with multiple, and often contradictory, institutional 
pressures on the organization (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008). My findings, however, suggest 
the opposite: multiple institutional demands constrain, rather than enhance, an organization’s 
ability to advance its strategic goals. From this perspective, what seems like a case of decoupling 
actually reflects an organization’s inability to implement reforms. A lack of implementation may 
indicate the presence of strong resistance from some powerful interest groups, rather than the 
firm’s attempt to decouple. But at the same time, thorough implementation may indicate 
stringent monitoring and pressuring by other groups, rather than passive acquiescence by the 
firm. Again, whether multiple institutional demands enhance or constrain organizational 
autonomy should critically depend on the constellations of power. For instance, when a power 
struggle among interest groups results in some kind of gridlock and at the same time 
organizations are under weak leadership, their ability to act can be severely undermined, leading 
to organizational paralysis (Pache and Santos 2010).  
More broadly, my findings reiterate a common theme in the sociology of the firm; that is, 
firms are embedded in a dense network of power relations that extends beyond the immediate 
boundaries of the firm (Friedland and Alford 1991; Granovetter 1985). Previous studies 
demonstrate how the relationship between firms and other social and political entities, such as 
the government, and the power dynamics among the latter shape the behavior of firms (Dobbin 
and Dowd 2000; Fligstein 1990; King and Pearce 2010; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Roy 1997). 
My findings of the contrasting roles of multiple interest groups over the implementation of 
downsizing resonate well with these previous studies. They demonstrate how being embedded in 122 
 
a web of power relations can limit as well as enhance a firm’s ability to act strategically. In 
addition, my findings also demonstrate the prominent role of class dynamics in the process. Most 
recent studies have neglected the role of labor unions in explaining firm behavior. This might be 
justifiable given the steady decline in the power of unions over the past several decades, but my 
findings of the role of unions suggest that workers’ voices should not be neglected especially 
when it comes to critical decisions on employment, of which implementation of downsizing is 
the prime example.  
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5  CONCLUSION 
 
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi saw two opposing movements inherent in modern 
market societies; the laissez-faire movement to expand the scope of the market, and the 
protective countermovement that emerges to resist the disembedding of the economy (Block 
2003). This tension has unfolded in the realm of finance in the U.S. since the Great Depression, 
culminating very recently in a serious financial crash. In response to the Great Depression, 
American law and politics, with the support of the New Deal coalition—a coalition of labor, 
small business owners, and farmers—deliberately diminished the power of financial institutions 
(Roe 1994). Regulations enacted during the New Deal Era—such as the Glass-Steagall Act and 
the Investment Company Act of 1940—fragmented finance and did not allow financial 
institutions to become powerful enough to gain control of firms. Since the 1980s, however, the 
situation changed drastically. Deregulation during the Reagan Administration and afterwards 
removed most of the regulations on financial institutions originating from the New Deal era. 
Empowered by this new economic and political environment, financial institutions have 
increased their influence over the operation of firms under the banner of the “shareholder value” 
revolution (Davis 2009; Dobbin and Zorn 2005; Fligstein 2001; Useem 1996).  
In this dissertation, I have examined how this rise of the shareholder-value paradigm and 
the growing influence of financial markets over firms since the 1980s have changed the 
employment practices of major U.S. firms, particularly on the case of workforce downsizings. 
Previously, downsizing occurred primarily in times of economic downturn. Recently, firms have 
tended to cut jobs in both good and bad times, in order to boost financial performance 
(Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Cappelli 1999; Osterman 1999). The hegemony of the shareholder-124 
 
value paradigm is evident in the prevalence of downsizing, especially given the lack of evidence 
that downsizing actually improves corporate performance. To be sure, downsizing can help firms 
to turn around declining performance by reducing labor costs, but most empirical studies 
document that downsizing is unlikely to lead to substantial savings and better performance. 
Nevertheless, there is a strong sense of taken-for-grantedness, not only among managers who 
conduct downsizing but also among workers who suffer from it, of the idea that downsizing is a 
painful but essential measure for the survival of firms and even of the overall economy.  
Early work by institutionalists sees taken-for-grantedness as the driving force behind the 
diffusion of new practices. This appears to be the case with the prevalence of downsizing during 
the recent decades. For instance, Budros (1997, p. 233) claims that as more firms engaged in 
downsizing throughout the 1980s, it came to be viewed as “a common-sense way of managing.” 
In a sense, there is much truth to this kind of claim. Louis Uchitelle (2006), the author of The 
Disposable American, probably the most profound critique of downsizing ever written, admits 
that it was hard even for him to overcome the notion that downsizing is “an unfortunate necessity” 
for revitalizing corporate America. Even today, this sense of inevitability seems to prevail. 
During the great recession in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, many U.S. firms cut 
jobs on a massive scale. On a single day, January 26, 2009, when the newly-elected government 
was pushing for a $787 billion stimulus bill designed to create or save 3.5 million jobs, five 
prominent U.S. firms—Caterpillar, Home Depot, Pfizer, Sprint, and Wyeth—announced their 
plan to eliminate a total of 55,000 jobs. The sheer size of downsizings announced by these firms 
made big news, but no specific action to prevent or even minimize their harmful impact was 
taken. The fact that massive downsizings arouse little opposition suggests that they have become 
objectified as a standard management practice (Suchman 1995). 125 
 
In this dissertation, I have taken issue with this widespread notion of downsizing as 
something unavoidable. To do so, I have investigated the power dynamics underneath the 
seemingly widespread social acceptance of downsizing. My investigation is informed by two 
significant recent developments in the literature of organizational institutionalism. One is the 
institutional approach to power (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; 
Fligstein 1990; Roy 1997). This approach combines the insights from institutional theory with 
those from power theory. The approach emphasizes the importance of interest-group politics in 
the process of institutionalization. In many important ways, it brings back in the initial insight of 
Karl Marx in his masterpiece The German Ideology, that the dominant ideology in each 
historical period reflects the prevailing mode of production and distribution of the period. The 
other significant development is institutional pluralism (Friedland and Alford 1991; Greenwood 
and Suddaby 2006; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Seo and Creed 2002). This approach posits 
that there exists in most situations more than one institutional logic, and that the dominance of 
the prevailing logic over others is often temporary and unstable. The significance of this 
approach is that it sensitizes researchers to the fact that the way things are today is not 
necessarily the only way that things should be, but rather one of many possible outcomes of the 
contest among, or the combination of, competing logics.  
Building on and combining these two new developments in institutional theory, I have 
proposed a socio-political account of the new use of downsizing as a strategy of maximizing 
shareholder value. In three separate but closely related empirical chapters, I have described the 
role of three key interest groups—investors, managers, and workers—who promoted sometimes 
complementary but sometimes conflicting institutional logics about the firm-employee 
relationship. In the first chapter, I have shown that the prevalence of downsizing since the 1980s 126 
 
reflects the interest of institutional investors, who have been the most avid proponents of the 
shareholder-value paradigm, and the interest of managers, who benefit from pursuing 
shareholder-value maximization. In the second chapter, I have explored the contest between 
competing models of the firm-employee relationship—the shareholder-value model and 
industrial unionism, respectively—over the legitimate form of downsizing, by analyzing how 
labor unions attempted to maintain temporary layoff while protesting permanent layoff but 
mostly failed in both fronts. In the last chapter, I have documented the lingering class politics 
around the legitimacy of downsizing, by showing the contrasting roles of investors, managers, 
and unions in the implementation of announced downsizing plans. Together, these three chapters 
illustrate the class politics simmering under the surface of the acceptance of downsizing for 
shareholder-value maximization.  
While this dissertation has focused on firm-level processes that have led to a new form of 
downsizing, many of the findings have broader social implications. By focusing on the 
prevalence and new form of workforce downsizing, I have explored firm-level causes of the 
precariousness of the U.S. labor market. The growing popularity of downsizing as a strategy for 
managing profits and share price has put a heavy burden on ordinary working- and middle-class 
Americans. Those who lose jobs as a result of plant closings or large-scale layoffs find it hard to 
find another job (Osterman 1999, p. 80-82), and their jobs are often replaced with temporary or 
part-time jobs (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). Field studies of layoff survivors show that 
layoffs hurt morale in the workplace and generate a sense of injustice (Brockner et al. 1987; 
Brockner et al. 1994). This is not surprising when even high performers downsize to generate 
more profits. Proponents of workplace innovations contend that by undermining the basis of 
mutual trust between firms and their employees, layoffs hamper efforts to introduce workplace 127 
 
innovations, such as high-performance work organizations (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Osterman 
2000). By demonstrating how the shareholder-value paradigm has increased the precariousness 
of the U.S. labor market, this dissertation takes an important first step toward a synthesis 
between the organizational literature on firm behavior and the labor-market literature on the 
precariousness of work. 
Turning to the future, how long will the trend in downsizing continue? To be sure, the 
hegemony of the shareholder-value paradigm has been significantly impaired in the aftermath of 
the recent collapse of the global financial system, but this has not yet led to a serious discussion 
of how to reform the firm-employee relationship in response to the severe hardship caused by the 
collapse. Rather, as I have mentioned above, firms have continued to shed jobs in order to 
maintain profitability and stock price. By squeezing more from a smaller number of workers, 
many firms have quickly rebounded, and some have even reported record profits. This corporate 
response to the recession suggests that the myth of downsizing as an inevitable necessity will 
continue at least in the near future. At the same time, however, the continuation of massive 
downsizing in the middle of a recession, and the persistence of high unemployment that lags 
behind the pace of economic recovery, may push the issue of employment—not only the quantity 
but also the quality of jobs—to the forefront of public discussion. Future work will need to trace 
whether and how this increased attention will reshape the class politics around downsizing and 
lead to a new model of the firm-employee relationship in the later 21st century. 
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